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Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Seriously in Criminal Cases after Morrison and
Kiobel
David Keenan and Sabrina P. Shroff*
In two recent decisions, Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.
Ct. 2869 (2010), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013), the Supreme Court emphatically reaffirmed the longstanding
presumption that federal statutes do not apply outside the territorial
United States absent a “clear indication” to the contrary. Although
Morrison and Kiobel involved civil suits under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)
respectively, this Article contends that the Court’s holdings ought to
similarly restrict the extraterritorial application of federal criminal law.
That is because Morrison and Kiobel instruct courts on how they should
interpret the reach of statutes generally—not just civil ones like section
10(b) and the ATS. Consequently, a host of criminal laws that
prosecutors have routinely applied extraterritorially in the past, but
whose geographic scope is facially ambiguous, ought to be
reinterpreted as reaching domestic conduct only. Such statutes
encompass not just securities fraud, but conduct as varied and
significant as antitrust violations, racketeering, drug trafficking, mail
fraud, and weapons possession.

* David Keenan received his J.D. from Yale Law School and will begin a clerkship with the
Honorable Paul G. Gardephe in November 2013. Sabrina P. Shroff is an Assistant Federal
Defender in the Southern District of New York who has represented several foreign nationals
charged with extraterritorial offenses. Our work on behalf of two of those clients, Paul
Mardirossian and Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, helped inform this Article. We wish to thank Fiona
Doherty, Arthur Ewenczyk, Daniel Hemel, Katie Kaplan, Doug Lieb, David McNamee, David
Patton, Kate Stith, Danielle Rosenthal, and Alex Roth. We also would like to express our
gratitude to the editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their editorial
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Morrison v. National Australia
Bank.1 Practitioners and academics quickly hailed the decision as a
landmark ruling in the Court’s securities law,2 jurisdictional,3 and
statutory interpretation4 jurisprudence.
Morrison applied the
1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation After Morrison v. National
Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance Based Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 249, 250 (2012) (describing Morrison as a “momentous decision” that “upend[ed] decades of
federal appeals court precedent in transnational securities law”); Luke Green, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank – The Dawn of a New Age?, ISS GOVERNANCE: INSIGHT: SECURITIES
LITIGATION (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2010/06/morrison-vnational-australia-bank-the-dawn-of-a-new-age.html (calling the decision “ground breaking”);
Richard Hans & Anthony D. Gill, Landmark Morrison Ruling: Supreme Court Rejects
Extraterritorial Application of Securities Exchange Act, DLA PIPER LITIGATION ALERT (June 30,
2010), http://www.dlapiper.com/landmark-morrison-ruling-supreme-court-rejects-extraterritorialapplication-of-securities-exchange-act/ (dubbing Morrison a “watershed” in securities litigation).
3. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1673, 1673 (2012) (recognizing Morrison as a “landmark” decision); Howard M. Wasserman,
The Demise of Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 947 (2011) (describing
Morrison as one of several “significant constitutional rulings” from the Court’s October 2009
term that helped clarify the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional rules).
4. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011)
(characterizing Morrison as “the most important decision construing the geographic scope of a
statute in almost twenty years”).
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“longstanding” presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 does not reach
securities transactions that occur outside the territorial United States.6
By doing so, the Court—in one fell swoop—overturned decades of
lower court precedent that had permitted such suits so long as plaintiffs
adequately alleged deceptive conduct that either occurred in, or had
substantial effects upon, the United States.7 The decision has already
had a profound impact on securities-fraud litigation. In several cases,
district courts have cited Morrison in dismissing civil suits against
foreign securities issuers.8 As lead counsel for National Australia Bank
noted just over a year after Morrison was decided, “[plaintiffs] don’t
even bother to bring these cases anymore.”9
This past term, the Court went one step further. In Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum,10 it relied on Morrison to hold that the Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”)11 does not permit federal courts to recognize a cause of
action for torts committed by aliens abroad. Kiobel makes clear the
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
6. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991))).
7. The so-called “conducts and effects test” was the product of several Second Circuit
decisions in the late 1960s and early 70s, the most famous of which is Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Co. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); see also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir. 1975);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206–08 (2d Cir. 1968), modified on other grounds en
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). To varying degrees, other circuits embraced the Second
Circuit’s approach. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 (collecting cases). For blunt criticism of the
Court’s departure from this long line of precedent, see Lea Brilmayer, The New
Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the
Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 655, 655
(2011) (“Last term, Morrison v. National Australia Bank jettisoned decades of settled law, casting
doubt on long-accepted practices of statutory construction and instructing the lower courts to turn
a deaf ear to indications of congressional intent any subtler than the proverbial meat axe.”).
8. See, e.g., In re Infineon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., No. 04-cv-04156, 2011 WL 7121006, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Morrison does not apply to
securities that are “dual listed” on foreign and domestic exchanges); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche
Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding over-the-counter equityswap agreements to be “essentially ‘transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets,’
and not ‘domestic transactions’ that merit the protection of § 10(b)” (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
at 2882, 2884)); In re Alstom SA Secs. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(rejecting “dual listed” argument); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying Morrison to purchases of foreign securities by American investors).
9. Alison Frankel, Morrison v. NAB’s 2nd Act: Way Beyond Securities Fraud and RICO, ON
THE CASE: A THOMSON-REUTERS BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2011/10/17/morrison-v-nabs-2nd-act-way-beyond-securities-fraud-and-rico/.
10. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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Court intended Morrison to do more than simply define the substantive
reach of U.S. securities laws. Although neither party raised the issue
below,12 the Justices ordered post-argument supplemental briefing as to
whether the ATS encompasses extraterritorial conduct.13 Ultimately,
they held that it did not, even though the ATS is merely a jurisdictional
statute that “does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief” itself.14
The Court reasoned that ATS litigation implicated the principles
underlying the presumption, particularly the desire to avoid
“unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy.”15
This Article examines an overlooked aspect of the Court’s renewed
emphasis on the presumption against extraterritoriality: its potential
impact on federal criminal law. Morrison and Kiobel are likely to have
far-reaching consequences for how courts interpret the substantive reach
of federal criminal statutes. That is because both decisions admonish
lower courts on how they should interpret federal statutes generally—
not just the ATS and section 10(b). As Justice Scalia succinctly
explained in Morrison: “When a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”16 The Morrison Court further
instructed, and Kiobel reiterated, that judges must “apply the
presumption in all cases” in order to “preserv[e] a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”17
Statutes will not be given extraterritorial effect absent a “clear
indication” of congressional intent.18 Consequently, in light of
Morrison and Kiobel, a host of criminal statutes that prosecutors
routinely applied extraterritorially in the past, but whose geographic
scope is facially ambiguous, ought to be reinterpreted as reaching
domestic conduct only. Such statutes encompass not just securities
fraud, but conduct as varied and significant as antitrust violations,19
racketeering,20 drug trafficking,21 mail fraud,22 and weapons
12. Brief for Respondents at 53–55, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)
(No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 259389, at *53–55.
13. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (directing parties to submit
supplemental briefing).
14. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
15. Id.
16. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
17. Id. at 2881 (emphasis added).
18. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (Sherman Antitrust Act).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2012) (RICO). As is true of violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Sherman Antitrust Act, violations of RICO can give rise to criminal and civil
liability. Compare id. § 1963 (criminal penalties), with id. § 1964 (civil penalties).
21. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (Controlled Substances Act).
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud).
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possession.23
The impact of Morrison on criminal cases is already evident. In
January 2013, the Ninth Circuit cited Morrison in holding that the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) does not
apply extraterritorially in a criminal proceeding.24 And this past
August, the Second Circuit similarly found that a criminal action under
section 10(b) must satisfy the same requirements as a civil one under
Morrison, namely that the underlying securities transaction(s) occur
domestically.25 The court explained: “[T]he general rule is that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to criminal statutes, and
section 10(b) is no exception.”26
Notwithstanding these recent decisions, considerable ambiguity
remains over whether the presumption ought to apply with equal force
to federal criminal statutes writ large. That ambiguity stems from
United States v. Bowman,27 a 1922 Supreme Court case that seems to
support exempting at least some criminal laws from the presumption
altogether. Lower courts, both before and after Morrison, have
routinely cited Bowman in rejecting efforts to apply the presumption to
federal criminal statutes.28 Indeed, notwithstanding its recent emphatic
declaration concerning the presumption’s applicability to section 10(b)
criminal prosecutions, the Second Circuit had previously asserted—in
two post-Morrison cases, no less—that the presumption against
extraterritoriality does not apply at all to criminal matters.29 Moreover,
23. See, e.g., id. § 924(c) (Gun Control Act of 1968).
24. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2013).
25. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL
4608948 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013). Dodd-Frank has since modified the Securities Exchange Act to
authorize “extraterritorial jurisdiction” for actions brought by the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) or Department of Justice (“DOJ”). See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). George Conway III,
the lawyer who represented the Morrison respondents, has argued that Congress’s apparent
drafting error (i.e., addressing jurisdiction rather than the substantive reach of the statute) should
invalidate efforts to apply the statute extraterritorially.
See George T. Conway III,
Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritorialityafter-dodd-frank/; see also Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 207–08 (2011);
Andrew Rocks, Whoops! The Imminent Reconciliation of U.S. Securities Laws with International
Comity After Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Drafting Error in the Dodd-Frank Act,
56 VILL. L. REV. 163, 188–95 (2011). Regardless of whether one accepts Conway’s argument, it
is clear that Dodd-Frank does not apply retroactively to conduct that occurred before its passage.
§ 4, 124 Stat. at 1390.
26. Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948, at *7.
27. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
28. See infra Part I.A.
29. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The ordinary presumption
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even when courts do apply the presumption, they must confront the
further difficulty of identifying a principled basis for differentiating
domestic from extraterritorial criminal conduct.
This Article aims to help guide scholars, litigants, and courts as they
approach this unsettled area of the law. It proceeds in two Parts. Part I
offers both an explanation for lower courts’ reluctance to apply the
presumption in criminal cases and a critique of their (varied) reasoning
for doing so. For instance, Part I.A describes how lower courts have
distorted Bowman’s holding in approving expansive applications of
U.S. law to acts and persons abroad. Part I.B examines the primary
justifications for invoking the presumption and explains how they ought
to apply with equal force to criminal prosecutions. Part II looks forward
to what a more robust application of the presumption in criminal cases
would look like in practice. In Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C, we consider
three statutes that are likely to receive greater scrutiny in the months
ahead. Those statutes include the criminal penalty provisions of section
10(b) and RICO, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which penalizes using,
carrying, or possessing a firearm during the commission of a drug
trafficking offense or crime of violence. As we show, each of these
statutes merits reinterpretation in light of the Supreme Court’s renewed
emphasis on the presumption’s role in delimiting the geographic scope
of facially ambiguous statutes.
I. AN UNPRINCIPLED DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW
While Morrison has provided civil defendants with a powerful tool
for dismissing a variety of private lawsuits,30 lower courts have
that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes.”); United States v.
Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do
not apply extraterritorially, does not apply to criminal statutes.” (citation omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 844–46 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citing Morrison in support of holding that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), does not apply extraterritorially); Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 Fed. App’x 35,
35 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding, pursuant to Morrison, that RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a
private civil lawsuit); Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010)
(same, but expressly declining to offer an opinion on whether the statute would reach
extraterritorial conduct if enforced by the government); see also Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
LLC, No. 4:12-cv-345, 2012 WL 2522599, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-20522,
2013 WL 3742492 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (holding that the Dodd-Frank Anti-Retaliation
Provision does not apply extraterritorially); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (finding that RICO does not apply extraterritorially); CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens,
824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1207–10 (D. Colo. 2011) (same); In re Le–Nature’s Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011
WL 2112533, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011) (same); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d
883, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (same); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23,
27–28 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011 WL
843957, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (same). But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736,
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generally been reluctant to apply its reasoning to criminal
prosecutions.31 As we seek to show here, such reluctance is unfaithful
to Morrison’s holding, unfair to criminal defendants, and unwise as a
matter of policy. Nothing in the Court’s decision suggests Morrison’s
logic applies to civil actions only. 32 To the contrary, the Court made
clear that the presumption applies in “all cases.”33 Moreover, the Court
745 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, j. vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (declining to apply Morrison
and the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute in part because “[t]here is
no indication in Morrison . . . or elsewhere, that a ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ existed
and could have been invoked by Congress in 1789”).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Sumeru, 449 F. App’x 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the
defendants’ Morrison claim and distinguishing 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), which prohibits fraudulent
conduct “in the offer and sale of securities,” from 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), which punishes fraud “in
connection with the purchase or sale” of securities); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 814
(11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that Morrison prohibited his conviction for
weapons possession under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) during an extraterritorial crime of violence
prohibited by the Torture Act); United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 105 (D.D.C. 2012)
(rejecting the defendants’ argument that, in light of Morrison, the mail fraud statute—18 U.S.C. §
1341—cannot be said to reach conduct that occurred in China); United States v. Campbell, 798 F.
Supp. 2d 293, 303–04 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying an Afghan contractor’s Morrison-based argument
that the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), does not apply extraterritorially, despite the
court’s acknowledgement that “[t]he plain language of § 666 contains no direct or explicit grant
of extraterritorial application”); United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077, 2011 WL
7416975, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (concluding that “[e]ven if an extraterritorial analysis
[were] implicated” in that case, counts alleging violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1952(a)(3), were proper because, under United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), “criminal
statutes may apply extraterritorially even without an explicit Congressional statement”); United
States v. Mandell, No. (S1) 09-cr-0662, 2011 WL 924891, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011)
(rejecting the defendants’ motion to dismiss securities fraud charges under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and
78ff, where the alleged fraud involved securities listed on the London Stock Exchange); see also
United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying Morrison in finding a
“clear and affirmative indication” that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), which
criminalizes travel overseas for the purpose of committing sexual acts with minors, to apply
extraterritorially, but further noting that under Bowman, “there is reason to doubt that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to § 2423(b) at all”); United States v. Ahmed, No.
10-cr-131, 2012 WL 983545, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (concluding that Morrison does not
“change th[e] analysis” of whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) applies extraterritorially and finding that,
because it is an “ancillary statute,” it has extraterritorial application whenever the underlying
substantive offense does).
32. In a footnote to his nonbinding concurrence, Justice Stevens unconvincingly sought to
limit the Court’s holding to actions brought by private civil litigants. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.12 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion does not,
however, foreclose the [Securities & Exchange] Commission from bringing enforcement actions
in additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the Commission’s authority is presented by
this case. The Commission’s enforcement proceedings not only differ from private § 10(b)
actions in numerous potentially relevant respects, but they also pose a lesser threat to international
comity.”). Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not address Justice Stevens’s concurrence
directly, but dismissed the comity concern, noting, “[t]he canon . . . or presumption [against
extraterritoriality] applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American
statute and a foreign law.” Id. at 2877–78 (majority opinion).
33. Id. at 2881 (emphasis added).
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saw its primary task as rendering a definitive construction of section
10(b)’s text, specifically the words “purchase or sale.” This observation
is significant because section 10(b) applies with equal force to both civil
and criminal securities fraud actions.34 And the Court rejected the
Solicitor General’s invitation to formulate a test that would exempt
criminal actions from the ordinary presumption.35
In fact, there is no compelling justification for a court to give two
constructions to a single statute—a domestic one for civil actions, and
an extraterritorial one for criminal prosecutions—based solely on the
nature of the underlying proceeding. If anything, the rule of lenity
suggests criminal defendants ought to receive more generous treatment
than their civil counterparts.36
From a policy standpoint, the
presumption against extraterritoriality functions as one of the few
structural checks against the unbridled exercise of U.S. power. This is
so because U.S. courts have repeatedly upheld Congress’s constitutional
authority to apply its laws extraterritorially, 37 while simultaneously
limiting the scope of foreign defendants’ constitutional rights.38 At a
34. Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act proscribes criminal punishments for anyone who
“willfully violates” any provision or rule under the Act, including section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). As the Supreme Court has explained
in the context of applying the rule of lenity in a civil matter, a statute with civil and criminal
applications can only have one authoritative meaning. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12
n.8 (2004) (“Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its
application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”).
35. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 14, 16–17, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191).
36. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (“[W]hen choice has to be made
between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we
choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite.” (citation omitted)).
37. See
generally
CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1–7 (2012) (collecting cases);
see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Both parties concede, as they
must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the
United States.”); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949) (“The question before us is
not the power of Congress to extend the eight hour law to work performed in foreign countries.
Petitioners concede that such power exists. The question is rather whether Congress intended to
make the law applicable to such work.”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d. Cir. 2003)
(“It is beyond doubt that, as a general proposition, Congress has the authority to enforce its laws
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (declining to find a Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination where the feared prosecution was foreign rather than
domestic); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (finding the defendant
was not entitled to dismissal or any other constitutional remedy where American law enforcement
kidnapped him in Mexico and brought him to the United States to stand trial); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (plurality opinion) (holding the Fourth Amendment
inapplicable to warrantless searches of foreign nationals outside the territorial United States). In
his United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez dissent, Justice Brennan underscored the perverse
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minimum, Congress should be required to speak clearly when it wishes
to criminalize extraterritorial conduct or subject foreign nationals to
American laws.
Recent developments suggest lower courts’ reluctance to apply
Morrison’s reasoning to criminal statutes may be waning. In August, a
Second Circuit panel concluded, in the context of a section 10(b)
criminal prosecution, that the presumption against extraterritorially
“does apply to criminal statutes, except where the law at issue is aimed
at protecting ‘the right of the government to defend itself.’”39 In similar
fashion, a Ninth Circuit panel recently applied the presumption to the
criminal penalty provisions of RICO.40 The court’s decision not only
recognized Morrison’s applicability in criminal cases,41 but also
highlighted conflicting interpretations regarding “the ‘focus’ of
congressional concern” in enacting RICO.42 Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, several lower courts had found that Congress’s focus in
enacting RICO was on criminal enterprises, as opposed to racketeering
activities generally.43 Consequently, in order to properly invoke RICO
consequences of exposing foreign nationals to punishment under U.S. laws, on the one hand,
while denying them the protections of the U.S. Constitution on the other. 494 U.S. at 282
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today creates an antilogy: the Constitution authorizes our
Government to enforce our criminal laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this
authority, the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them. This cannot be. At the very least,
the Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable correlative of the Government’s power to enforce the
criminal law.”).
39. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL
4608948, at *5 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98
(1922)).
40. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2013).
41. Id. at 974–75 (“In the wake of Morrison, this circuit has not considered whether RICO
applies extraterritorially. . . . Other courts that have addressed the issue have uniformly held that
RICO does not apply extraterritorially. . . . Although those cases addressed the civil rather than
the criminal RICO statute, they are faithful to Morrison’s rationale . . . . Therefore, we begin the
present analysis with a presumption that RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a civil or
criminal context.”); see also United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011)
(applying Morrison and finding a “clear and affirmative indication” that Congress intended 18
U.S.C. § 2423(b), which criminalizes travel overseas for the purpose of committing sexual acts
with minors, to apply extraterritorially, but dismissing one count predicated entirely on
defendant’s travel between foreign states). But see United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700
(2d Cir. 2012) (“The ordinary presumption that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no
application to criminal statutes.”); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“The presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially, does not apply to
criminal statutes.”).
42. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010). In applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality to section 10(b), Morrison borrowed this “focus” test from
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1991) (“Applying the same mode of
analysis here, we think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the
deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”).
43. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933,
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in those courts, prosecutors or civil plaintiffs need to prove the
existence of a domestic criminal enterprise. The Ninth Circuit, by
contrast, found the statute’s focus to be on the pattern of racketeering
activity itself.44 Under this reading, enforcing RICO against a foreign
enterprise is unobjectionable so long as the alleged racketeering activity
occurred domestically.45
These conflicting interpretations illustrate the difficulty courts
sometimes face when applying Morrison. But as this Article argues,
that difficulty is not a reason to avoid the presumption’s application
altogether, but rather a reminder of the useful role it plays in
incentivizing Congress to speak with greater clarity in drafting federal
statutes. The presumption offers an interpretive aid that allows courts to
“determine Congress’ intent where Congress likely did not consider the
matter and where other indicia of intent are in approximate balance.”46
Before turning to an evaluation of Morrison’s and Kiobel’s potential
impact on a variety of criminal statutes in Part II, this Part first
examines why lower courts have heretofore resisted applying the
presumption in criminal cases. As we explain, such resistance is both
inconsistent with Morrison’s and Kiobel’s teachings as well as
misguided as a matter of logic and policy.
A. Confronting a Misunderstood Precedent: United States v.
Bowman
If the presumption against extraterritoriality really is the
“longstanding” rule of statutory interpretation that Morrison and Kiobel
suggest it is, why have lower courts typically avoided applying it when

938–40 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Farm Credit Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Krones, Inc. (In re Le–Nature’s,
Inc.), No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 n. 7 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011); In re Toyota, 785 F.
Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011
WL 84395, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); Cedeno v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2012).
44. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977 (“[A]n inquiry into the application of RICO to Defendants’
conduct is best conducted by focusing on the pattern of Defendants’ racketeering activity as
opposed to the geographic location of Defendants’ enterprise.”).
45. Id. at 979 (“Defendants’ pattern of racketeering activity may have been conceived and
planned overseas, but it was executed and perpetuated in the United States. . . . Having
determined that RICO’s focus is on the pattern of racketeering activity, we conclude that
Defendants’ criminal plan, which included violation of United States immigration laws while the
Defendants were in the United States, falls within the ambit of the statute.”). To complicate
matters even further, the Second Circuit, while likewise holding that Congress did not intend for
RICO to apply extraterritorially, has avoided the focus question altogether by simply declaring
that “slim contacts with the United States” are “insufficient to support extraterritorial
application.” Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010).
46. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390 (2005).
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determining the scope of federal criminal laws?
The answer lies, in part, in an oft-quoted, but frequently
mischaracterized, passage of a 1922 Supreme Court case, United States
v. Bowman.47 The defendants in Bowman stood accused of attempting
to defraud a U.S.-owned corporation on a shipment of oil destined for
Rio de Janiero.48 None of the alleged criminal activity took place
within the territorial boundaries of the United States and the statute
itself was silent as to its extraterritorial effect.49 Still, the Court found
the defendants’ conduct fell within the statute’s reach. In so holding,
the Court began by acknowledging the general principle that Congress
ordinarily legislates with domestic concerns in mind:
Crimes against private individuals or their property . . . must of course
be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government
where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them is to be
extended outside the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for
Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the
purpose of Congress.50

This statement was consistent with more than one hundred years of
precedent; as early as 1818, the Court had invoked the presumption in
holding that the 1790 Crimes Act did not reach a robbery committed by
foreign nationals aboard a foreign ship while on the high seas.51
Where Bowman broke new ground, was in holding that certain
statutes, like those making it a crime to defraud a U.S.-owned entity,
ought to be given extraterritorial effect to avoid undermining
Congress’s “purpose” in enacting the statute.52 The Court held that the
ordinary presumption
should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not
logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction,

47. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
48. Significantly, the Court declined to reach the thorny issue of whether foreign national
defendants fell within the statute’s ambit. Id. at 101.
49. The provision at issue, section 35 of the U.S. Criminal Code, read in relevant part:
Whoever shall . . . cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any . . .
corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, any claim upon or
against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, or
any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Act of Oct. 13, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015; Bowman, 260 U.S. at 100 n.1.
50. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
51. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (“[Although] ‘any person or
persons,’ are broad enough to comprehend every human being,” such “general words must . . . be
limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state.”).
52. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97.
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but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if
committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents. Some such
offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the government because of the local acts required to constitute them.
Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial
jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the
statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed
by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home. In
such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific
provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and
foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the
offense.53

The Court did not make clear whether it intended to create a broad
exception to the ordinary presumption for certain types of statutes or,
alternatively, indicate a narrow set of circumstances under which the
presumption could be overcome. That oversight, unfortunately, has
caused great confusion for lower courts trying to interpret the decision’s
meaning.
By its terms, Bowman appears to cover only a narrow subset of cases,
namely those where the “nature of the offense” implicates the
government’s right “to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud
wherever perpetrated.”54 In fact, the Bowman Court was quite specific
about the kinds of statutes that would permit a court to infer
extraterritorial intent. Among those it listed as examples were laws that
punished “knowingly certify[ing] a false invoice [while acting as a U.S.
consul],” “forging or altering a ship’s papers,” “enticing desertions from
the naval service,” “bribing a United States officer of the civil, military
or naval service,” and “steal[ing] . . . property of the United States . . . to
be used for military or naval service.”55
All of the aforementioned crimes share two common features. First,
they are all directed at the federal government itself. Second, each is
likely to occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.56
Accordingly, Bowman is properly read as fashioning a statutory
interpretation test consisting of two operative conditions, both of which
must be satisfied before a court can infer extraterritoriality from “the
53. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 99.
56. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in
Support of Defendants-Appellants at 11, United States v. Mandell, No. 12-cr-1967 (2d Cir. 2012),
2012 WL 4336737 (“Consuls, ships, naval service, prizes—all clearly connote the high seas or
foreign lands.”).
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nature of the offense.”57
This is precisely how the Supreme Court characterized Bowman in a
subsequent decision, Skiriotes v. Florida, where it cited the case for the
proposition that “a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly
injurious to the government, and are capable of perpetration without
regard to particular locality is to be construed as applicable to citizens
of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though
there be no express declaration to that effect.”58 Otherwise, as the
Court recognized in another case postdating Bowman, “criminal statutes
of the United States are not by implication given an extraterritorial
effect.”59 What is more, as the Second Circuit has recognized, the
Court’s frequent pronouncements on the presumption in recent years,
“none of which mention[] Bowman, seem to require that all statutes,
without exception, be construed to apply within the United States only,
unless a contrary intent appears.”60
Notwithstanding these precedents, the government has put forward an
alternative reading of Bowman in several post-Morrison criminal cases.
It has argued that Bowman exempts all statutes from the ordinary
presumption against extraterritoriality when they are applied to a
criminal defendant.61 Hence, the government would give section 10(b)
two distinct meanings—one for civil cases and another for criminal
prosecutions.
In making a similar argument regarding RICO,
government attorneys went so far as to suggest that, under Bowman,
statutes actually enjoy a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality in
criminal cases.62
The government’s argument would be remarkable for its audacity
were it not for the fact that lower courts routinely misinterpret Bowman
in a similar fashion.63 In their zeal to affirm the extraterritorial reach of
57. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
58. 313 U.S. 69, 73–74 (1941) (emphasis added).
59. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933) (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98).
60. Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that “Bowman
should be read narrowly” and that “[r]eading Bowman as limited to its facts, only criminal
statutes, and perhaps only those relating to the government’s power to prosecute wrongs
committed against it, are exempt from the presumption”).
61. Sur-Reply Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 4608948 (2d Cir. 2012), 2012 WL 1799150.
62. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Limited Rehearing En Banc at
3, Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 07-4553-cv)
[hereinafter United States as Amicus Norex Brief].
63. See Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 165 (2011)
(“[C]ourts [of appeals] have repeatedly stretched the substantive reasoning of Bowman to apply
more and more criminal statutes extraterritorially.”).
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criminal prosecutions, lower courts have occasionally cited Bowman as
reason to exempt criminal statutes from the presumption altogether.64
More commonly, courts have invoked Bowman to support the
extraterritorial application of any law whose “nature” suggests
transborder conduct or whose effectiveness could be hindered if
confined to the territorial United States.65 Thus, even crimes that do not
directly victimize U.S. interests or persons have been given
extraterritorial effect. Instances where courts have declined to apply a
criminal statute extraterritorially, by comparison, have become the
exception rather than the rule.66 Among the disparate statutes courts
have exempted from the territorial presumption are those directed at
price-fixing by foreign corporations,67 the dissemination of child
pornography,68 drug trafficking,69 firearms possession,70 and murder or
64. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Kassar,
660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011).
65. Zachary Clopton argues that Morrison’s emphasis on congressional “focus” might actually
enable courts to affirm this prior case law expansively interpreting Bowman. See Clopton, supra
note 63, at 139 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, which seemingly narrowed
the situations to which U.S. law applies, actually permits a new approach that the Supreme Court
could follow in affirming much of the criminal law trend.”).
66. We have only been able to locate five cases where the presumption served to defeat the
government’s attempted extraterritorial application of a federal criminal statute. See, e.g., United
States v. Lopez-Vanegas, 493 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 846, which make it unlawful for any person to conspire to possess a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute, do not apply extraterritorially); United States v. Gatlin, 216
F.3d 207, 210–11 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining defendant could not be prosecuted for sexual
assault on a German military base because courts must presume jurisdictional statutes have no
extraterritorial effect); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding
against the extraterritorial application of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972); United
States v. Reeves, 62 M.J. 88, 92 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (concluding that the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 does not apply extraterritorially); United States v. Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52,
59 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (same).
67. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the
criminal provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, like their civil counterparts, apply to wholly
extraterritorial conduct).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1231 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[E]xtraterritorial
application is supported by the nature of § 2251A and Congress’s other efforts to combat child
pornography.”); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993) (“‘[T]o deny
[extraterritorial application of the Act] would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the
statute[s].’ We can think of few more important efforts than eradicating sexual exploitation of
children.” (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922))); United States v. Thomas,
893 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Congress has created a comprehensive statutory
scheme to eradicate sexual exploitation of children. . . . Punishing the creation of child
pornography outside the United States that is actually, is intended to be, or may reasonably be
expected to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce is an important enforcement tool.”).
69. For instance, every circuit agrees that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it a crime to
“manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance,” reaches at least some extraterritorial conduct. Interestingly,
courts have offered different justifications for why § 841(a)(1) applies extraterritoriality. See,
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other violent acts committed to further a racketeering enterprise.71 The
Eleventh Circuit has aptly summarized the prevailing attitude of most
courts: “On authority of Bowman, courts in this Circuit and elsewhere
have routinely inferred congressional intent to provide for
extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign offenses that cause domestic
harm.”72 Thus, in the criminal context, the presumption against
extraterritorially has been flipped on its head.

e.g., United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding extraterritorial
application appropriate because the statute “comports with the reasoning behind the Supreme
Court’s Bowman decision . . . [and] ‘[i]t would be going too far to say that because Congress does
not fix any locus it intended to exclude the high seas in respect of this crime’” (second alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161,
167 (3d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that “Congress undoubtedly intended to prohibit conspiracies to
import controlled substances . . . as part of its continuing effort to contain the evils caused on
American soil by foreign as well as domestic suppliers of illegal narcotics” and concluding that
“[t]o deny such use of the criminal provisions ‘would be greatly to curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute[s]’” (quoting Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98)); United States v. Orozco-Prada,
732 F.2d 1076, 1088 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The intent to cause effects within the United States also
makes it reasonable to apply to persons outside United States territory a statute which is not
expressly extraterritorial in scope.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 137
(5th Cir. 1980) (upholding the extraterritorial application of the statute to defendants accused of
possessing marijuana bound for the United States because “[t]he power to control efforts to
introduce illicit drugs into the United States from the high seas and foreign nations is a necessary
incident to Congress’ efforts to eradicate all illegal drug trafficking”); United States v. Arra, 630
F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 1980) (omitting mention of the presumption but affirming the conviction
because “[a] sovereign may exercise jurisdiction over acts done outside its geographical
jurisdiction which are intended to produce detrimental effects within it”). But see United States v.
Lopez-Vanegas, 493 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]here, as here, the object of the
conspiracy was to possess controlled substances outside the United States with the intent to
distribute outside the United States, there is no violation of § 841(a)(1) . . . .”); accord United
States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Gould, 13 M.J. 734, 738
(A.C.M.R. 1982).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 814–15 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying
Bowman to illegal firearm possession); United States v. Ahmed, 10-Cr-131 (PKC), 2012 WL
983545, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (allowing § 924(c), which prohibits illegal firearm
possession, to have extraterritorial application); United States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d
775, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same).
71. United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994).
72. United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
Plummer reversed a district court’s holding that 18 U.S.C. § 545, which makes smuggling a crime
punishable by up to twenty years in prison, did not apply to a defendant captured with thousands
of Cuban cigars outside the territorial waters of the United States. Id. at 1305 (“Although the
completed crime of smuggling does require some conduct within U.S. territory, smuggling is
quintessentially an international crime, and the acts constituting an attempt to smuggle are not
‘logically dependent on their locality.’” (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98)); see also Brulay v.
United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967) (“Since smuggling by its very nature involves
foreign countries, and since the accomplishment of the crime always requires some action in a
foreign country, we have no difficulty inferring that Congress did intend that the provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 545 should extend to foreign countries at least as to citizens of the United States . . . .”).
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The tendency of courts to discern the extraterritorial reach of criminal
statutes by asking whether the underlying conduct they seek to prohibit
causes domestic harm is remarkably similar to the “conduct-and-effects
test” that the Supreme Court recently repudiated in Morrison. In
Morrison, foreign plaintiffs attempted to sue predominantly foreign
defendants under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act for
making false and misleading statements in connection with foreign
securities transactions involving an Australian bank.73 Applying longsettled precedent, the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over
the case because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either that the wrongful
conduct had occurred in the United States or that it had substantial
effects on the United States or its citizens.74
While reaching the same outcome, the Supreme Court faulted the
Second Circuit’s reasoning on two grounds. First, the question of
extraterritoriality should be properly conceived of as a merits question
rather than a jurisdictional one. In other words, “to ask what conduct §
10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits,”75 not whether
Congress has empowered U.S. courts to hear the underlying claim.
Second, the Court chided the Second Circuit for having “excised the
presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of §
10(b)” by replacing it with a test that asked “whether it would be
reasonable . . . to apply the statute to a given situation.”76 Such a test,
the Court commented, was a judicial invention that lacked a “textual or
even extratextual basis.”77
Instead, courts should “apply the
presumption in all cases” in order to “preserv[e] a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”78
To be sure, Morrison involved the interpretation of a civil statute.
But there is little reason to think its logic does not apply with equal
force to criminal ones. Indeed, as this Article shows, there is no
compelling reason for applying the presumption against
extraterritorially differently based on whether a statute (or its
application) is criminal or civil in nature. Whatever one thinks of its
validity, the presumption represents a general impression of how
Congress ordinarily enacts laws as well as a prudential preference that it
make its intentions explicit when it wishes to apply those laws abroad.
73. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010).
74. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
75. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
76. Id. at 2878–79.
77. Id. at 2879.
78. Id. at 2881.
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In both the criminal and civil contexts, Congress is well aware of how
to give extraterritorial effect to its statutes. When it fails to do so,
courts ought to assume that the law applies to domestic conduct only. 79
The question then becomes one of degree, namely whether a
defendant’s domestic conduct, if any, rises to a level sufficient to trigger
liability under the charged offense.
B. Understanding the Purposes of the Presumption in Civil and
Criminal Cases
This Section will demonstrate that the four values commonly cited in
support of the presumption apply with equal force to criminal statutes.80
The weight given to these values by the Court has varied over time,
leading some commentators to question the presumption’s utility as a
tool of statutory interpretation. While we acknowledge the legitimacy
of some of these criticisms, our primary concern is to show that, so long
as the presumption exists, there can be no valid reason for restricting its
application to civil statutes alone.
For starters, the Morrison Court noted that the presumption rests on
the general observation that “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect
to domestic, not foreign matters.”81 Although one can question the
accuracy of that observation given our increasingly globalized world,82
there is little reason (empirical or otherwise) to think Congress is more
likely to believe it is legislating globally when addressing criminal, as
opposed to civil, concerns. Moreover, as the U.S. Code amply
demonstrates, Congress knows how to give extraterritorial effect to its
statutes when it wants to.83
79. Here, we take issue with an idea put forward by Clopton, supra note 63, at 187 (proposing
that courts, in interpreting criminal statutes, could “apply[] Chevron-type deference to the
executive branch in foreign affairs”).
80. For a general discussion of the history behind this “long-standing” presumption, see
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 85, 115–20 (1998).
81. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
82. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 660 (1990) (arguing the
presumption “is no longer valid; Congress has expanded its regulatory interests to meet growing
transnational markets and problems. To enforce a strict territorial result in extraterritorial cases is
to ignore the more likely contemporary intent of Congress”); James E. Ward, “Is That Your Final
Answer?” The Patchwork Jurisprudence Surrounding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 717 (2002) (arguing “that the premises supporting the
existence of the presumption are no longer valid, and the doctrine should therefore be reversed to
support a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality”).
83. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of examples in the U.S. Code. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
2339B(d) (2012) (material support for terrorism) (entitled “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction” and
describing conditions where its exercise is authorized); id. § 3271(a) (sex trafficking) (“Whoever,
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The Morrison Court’s second rationale for the presumption—
“preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate
with predictable effects”—likewise draws no distinction between a
law’s civil and criminal application.84 Professor William Eskridge has
analogized this justification to “driving a car on the right-hand side of
the road,” explaining that “[i]t is not so important to choose the best
convention as it is to choose one convention and stick to it.”85 If the
value of the presumption lies in ensuring predictability, surely courts
ought to apply the rule uniformly to all statutes rather than “guess anew
in each case” by engaging in what Morrison derisively termed “judicialspeculation-made-law.”86
A third consideration, largely dismissed as irrelevant by the Morrison
majority87 but featured prominently in Justice Roberts’s Kiobel
opinion,88 justifies the presumption as a prudential doctrine that helps
prevent embarrassing or dangerous conflicts with foreign laws and
foreign sovereigns. In this vein, as Justice Rehnquist noted in EEOC v.

while employed by or accompanying the Federal Government outside the United States, engages
in conduct outside the United States that would constitute an offense under chapter 77 or 117 of
this title if the conduct had been engaged in within the United States or within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for that
offense.”); 21 U.S.C. § 960a(b)(5) (2012) (illicit drug import and export) (“There is jurisdiction
over an offense under this section if . . . (5) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an
offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense
occurs outside the United States.”).
84. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
85. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 277 (1994).
Eskridge is critical of the Court’s decision in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991),
which applied the presumption to invalidate an American-born plaintiff’s Title VII suit alleging
discrimination by Aramco in Saudi Arabia. For the presumption to be valid, Eskridge explains,
the interpretive regime must remain both transparent and fixed. But, he argues that a
congressional observer at the time of Title VII’s passage would not have realized that the
presumption was good law, much less that it required something close to a clear statement by
Congress to overcome. Id. at 281–85.
86. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
87. Id. at 2877–78 (“The canon or presumption [against extraterritoriality] applies regardless
of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.”).
88. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“The presumption
against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an
interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the
political branches.”); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting
that the presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord”); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) (refusing to construe the National Labor Relations
Act as including foreign flagged vessels within its coverage because doing so “would inevitably
lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs”); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S.
138, 147 (1957) (“For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.”).
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Arabian American Oil Co., the presumption serves to “protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord.”89 Of course, few issues are more
politically sensitive than a nation’s claimed authority to criminally
punish the citizens of a foreign sovereign for acts committed abroad.
The recent prosecution of Viktor Bout offers a colorful illustration.
Bout, a Russian arms dealer nicknamed the “merchant of death,” was
arrested in Thailand pursuant to an American sting operation in which
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents portrayed
themselves as members of the Colombian terrorist group Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucinares de Colombia (“FARC”).90 Bout’s contested
extradition and subsequent conviction prompted a stern rebuke from the
Russian foreign ministry, which accused the American justice system of
fulfilling a “political order” and warned of possible harm to U.S.Russian relations.91 Russia’s reaction to Bout’s prosecution reveals the
complexity of applying the presumption in a criminal context. Matters
of foreign policy and decisions concerning whom to prosecute are
ordinarily entrusted to the Executive’s exclusive discretion. Such
deference, however, is constitutionally appropriate only where the
Executive’s power is exclusive or its power to prosecute is clear.
Courts, by invoking the presumption only where Congress has not
spoken clearly concerning a statute’s geographic scope, can restrain
executive action in a manner that is consistent with their limited role in
our democratic system of government.
Relatedly, the presumption is sometimes envisioned as serving
broader structural concerns that affirm Congress’s role in the
lawmaking process and limit activist judicial interpretations. As
Professor Curtis Bradley has explained in evaluating the basis for the
presumption in patent cases, “[T]he determination of whether and how
to apply federal legislation to conduct abroad raises difficult and
sensitive policy questions that tend to fall outside both the institutional
competence and constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary.”92 In
89. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
90. U.S. officials brought a tremendous degree of political pressure to bear on their Thai
counterparts in order to secure Bout’s extradition. Indeed, the battle over his extradition
constituted a sort of proxy war between the United States and Russia. See Johnny Dwyer,
Wikileaks: How the U.S. Helped Bring in a ‘Merchant of Death,’ TIME, Dec. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2034760,00.html.
91. Michael Schwirtz, Russia Denounces U.S. Sentencing of Arms Dealer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/07/world/europe/russia-denounces-us-sentencing-ofarms-dealer.html?_r=0.
92. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA.
J. INT’L L. 505, 516 (1997).
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addition, the executive branch may seek to apply certain statutes in a
manner that Congress never intended to authorize.93 Such concerns are
amplified in the criminal setting because prosecutors, as opposed to
private litigants, purport to speak on behalf of the U.S. government.
One significant counterargument for refraining from applying the
presumption in criminal and/or regulatory matters merits
consideration.94 That argument embodies a functionalist concern with
the different incentives that motivate civil litigants and government
officials. In its most basic form, the argument would proceed as
follows: absent Morrison’s and Kiobel’s holdings, U.S. courts would
face an avalanche of nuisance suits directed at foreign corporations.95
As a consequence, those corporations would spend substantial sums to
settle or otherwise avoid liability by circumventing personal jurisdiction
or conduct-and-effects hooks to the United States.96 Actions initiated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) are inherently different, according to the argument’s
logic. Unlike civil plaintiffs, U.S. Attorneys and government regulators
can be counted on to exercise discretion before initiating a
prosecution.97 Moreover, courts may reasonably rely on the expectation
93. One example, though perhaps an imperfect one, is the EEOC’s effort to apply the
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act abroad. In EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., the
agency argued that Congress, in passing Title VII, intended for its provisions to cover Americans
employed by American corporations outside the United States. 499 U.S. at 248. But the Court
was unable to find any “affirmative evidence” that Congress intended for the statute to apply in
such a manner and further noted that “Congress’ awareness of the need to make [such a showing]
is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the
extraterritorial application of a statute.” Id. at 258. Some scholars have criticized the Court’s
interpretation on the grounds that “there was ample legislative and implied textual evidence of
congressional extraterritorial intent.” Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of
International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 221 (1993). But even if such criticisms are
true, the underlying rationale of the opinion survives. In the face of perceived ambiguity, there is
a salutary value to having Congress make its intentions explicit, as it did with respect to Title
VII’s extraterritorial application the year after Arabian Am. Oil Co. was decided. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a)–(b)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1 (2012)).
94. We are indebted to Daniel Hemel for alerting us to this counterargument.
95. Kara Baquizal, The Extraterritorial Reach of Section 10(B): Revisiting Morrison in Light
of Dodd-Frank, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1544, 1580 (“The United States should not open itself up
to plaintiffs hoping to take advantage of the United States’ entrepreneurial legal system with the
aid of attorneys willing to search every securities transaction with a fine-toothed comb to find
some tenuous connection to the United States.”).
96. Id. at 1555 (“Making the private right of action under §10(b) available to investors
involved in predominantly international transactions, such as ‘f-cubed’ transactions, would be the
type of legal cost that a non-US issuer might find too great, to the detriment of the US markets.”).
97. The appellants in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum embraced an analogous argument
regarding universal jurisdiction. See Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 42, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petrol., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2012) (No. 10-1491) (“The distinction between universal criminal
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that there will be some coordination between executive agencies and the
State Department over issues of international comity. 98 Finally,
resource constraints on prosecutors will serve to defeat any potential
litigation flood.99
Admittedly, these arguments may be persuasive from a policy
standpoint. At least in the securities law context Congress seems to
have thought so, as evidenced by its insertion of a provision into the
Dodd-Frank Act that purportedly permits extraterritorial actions by the
SEC and DOJ, but not by civil litigants.100 And one can imagine other
contexts where distinguishing between civil matters, on the one hand,
and regulatory or criminal matters, on the other, would make sense.101
But that is precisely the point of the presumption: it is the courts’
“function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however
modest that may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might be
used to achieve.”102 That is because a statute’s potential extraterritorial
application is the type of sensitive policy determination the Constitution
has appropriately delegated to Congress. If Congress, in turn, wishes to
delegate that responsibility to executive agencies, that is fine. But one
should expect, at a minimum, for it to say so explicitly. 103 Whether or
and civil jurisdiction makes sense because a private civil cause of action lacks ‘the check imposed
by prosecutorial discretion.’” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004))).
98. Curtis Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 347
(2001) (“Whereas the government is responsible in the criminal context for considering the
foreign policy costs of exercising universal jurisdiction, private plaintiffs in civil cases have no
such responsibility and, in any event, are unlikely to have the incentive or expertise to do so.”);
see also United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The
executive’s expert exercise of prosecutorial discretion and foreign diplomacy should be more than
sufficient to avoid the conflicts the dissent thinks our holding risks creating.”); Clopton, supra
note 63, at 187 (“Even if courts worry only about conflicts with foreign laws, the executive
branch is likely to be more cognizant of these potential conflicts than the average civil plaintiff.”).
99. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 519 (2003)
(“Resource constraints, a potent brake on overprosecution in domestic systems, will limit the ICC
Prosecutor’s ability to pursue all meritorious cases.”).
100. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
101. Arguably, the Alien Tort Statute is one context where Congress might wish to distinguish
between civil and regulatory enforcement based on the locus of the alleged acts. As the Court
explained in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), private causes of action like the ATS
lack the “check imposed by prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at 727. Consequently, they arguably
pose a greater threat to U.S. foreign relations than do the limited number of prosecutions for
international human rights violations that Congress has seen fit to authorize. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1091, 2340A, 2441 (2012) (genocide, torture, and war crimes, respectively).
102. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
103. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 377–80 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Congress, which has the sole authority to determine the extraterritorial reach of domestic laws,
is fully capable of conveying its policy choice to the Executive and the courts. I would not
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not it is wise policy for Congress or the Executive to apply a statute
extraterritorially is, after all, a different question than whether courts
should interpret that statute as encompassing extraterritorial acts.104
Based on the principles guiding the presumption as outlined in
Morrison and Kiobel, we think the answer to the latter question is
clearly “no.”
II. APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION AFTER MORRISON AND KIOBEL: SECTION
10(B) AND BEYOND
This Part offers a nuanced explanation of how various criminal
statutes will fare after Morrison and Kiobel. The question is more
complex than it initially appears because determining whether a statute
applies extraterritorially is not simply a matter of reading its text. For
one, Morrison and Kiobel did not endorse a clear statement rule and
therefore, context still matters. Does this mean courts can infer
extraterritorial application from the “nature” of the offense à la
Bowman? Is it enough to characterize the offense in question as one
that often occurs internationally, such as drug smuggling?
Second, as the Morrison court explained, “it is a rare case of
prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the
territory of the United States.”105 Courts must therefore identify a
statute’s “focus” before determining whether a defendant’s domestic
conduct is sufficient for criminal liability to attach. In Morrison, for
instance, the Court determined that “the focus of the Exchange Act is
not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases
and sales of securities in the United States.”106 Consequently, the locus
of the Morrison defendants’ alleged deception was irrelevant since the
securities transactions at issue occurred in Australia. According to
Justice Stevens, this focus test, rather than the presumption, was the
“real motor” of the Court’s decision.107 Sometimes determining a
statute’s focus is straightforward, but in other cases Congress may have
assume from legislative silence that Congress left the matter to executive discretion.”).
104. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“[T]he danger of
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of
the ATS, because the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”);
see also United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The point of
the policy concerns ‘behind’ the presumption against applying statutes to have extraterritorial
effect is that they mean that a court should ordinarily understand Congress’s commands to apply
only within U.S. borders, not that a court should itself apply those policy concerns to the case at
bar and read the statute based on the result of its own policy analysis.”).
105. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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had many goals or its intent might not be otherwise apparent.
What is more, determining a statute’s focus is only half the battle.
Courts must also decide when a defendant’s domestic conduct is
sufficient to bring it within a statute’s reach. In Kiobel, for instance, the
Court emphasized that “even where [ATS] claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”108 But as
Justice Alito noted in his concurrence, “[t]his formulation obviously
leaves much unanswered.”109 The goal of this Part is to begin to fill in
the blanks.
In addition to analyzing section 10(b), this Part reviews two other
statutes whose extraterritorial scope is similarly ambiguous: RICO and
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). While these are certainly not the only statutes
whose interpretation Morrison is likely to affect, they are among the
most important. Both statutes impose lengthy mandatory minimum
sentences on criminal defendants.
RICO, which criminalizes
racketeering activity by criminal enterprises, appears to be Morrison’s
next victim because, like section 10(b), it is silent regarding its
extraterritoriality and subjects defendants to both civil and criminal
penalties.110 Some courts, including the Second and Ninth circuits,
have already relied on Morrison to bar RICO’s extraterritorial
application.111 Because the same substantive statute governs civil and
criminal RICO actions, the statutory construction issue is identical to
that of section 10(b). On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which
makes it a crime to possess a weapon in connection with certain
enumerated felonies, has no civil component. It is nevertheless a
shining example of a statute whose reach should be restricted if the
presumption is to be meaningfully applied in criminal cases going
forward.
A. Section 10(b)
Because Morrison involved a private civil lawsuit, the Supreme
Court did not have occasion to consider whether or how the
presumption would apply in criminal prosecutions. Two Second Circuit
cases, one recently decided and the other still pending, help illustrate
how courts have begun to resolve these unanswered questions.112 Both
108. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
109. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
110. For a detailed discussion of civil RICO in light of Morrison, see R. Davis Mello, Life
After Morrison: Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1385 (2011).
111. See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
112. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL
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Alberto Vilar and Ross Mandell, the primary defendants in the two
cases, are larger-than-life figures convicted of violating section 10(b) by
engineering Ponzi-like schemes that defrauded both foreign and
American investors. On appeal, they each argued that Morrison
clarified the reach of section 10(b) in such a way that their securities
fraud convictions ought to be reversed.113 In August, the panel hearing
Vilar’s appeal rejected the government’s broad argument that the
presumption against extraterritoriality has no effect on criminal statutes.
Instead, the court affirmed the presumption’s general applicability to all
actions, while concluding Vilar and his co-defendant had nonetheless
engaged in substantial domestic conduct to bring their criminal scheme
within the statute’s ambit.
Prior to his conviction, Vilar, who at one point was among the top
benefactors of New York’s Metropolitan Opera, had a long track record
of successful investments in technology companies.114 But the crash of
the Internet bubble, together with his penchant for underwriting
expensive opera productions, proved to be his undoing.115
In
November 2008, prior to the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision, a jury
convicted Vilar and his business partner Gary Tanaka of using their
SEC-registered advisory firm to entice American investors into
purchasing fraudulent investment products.116 According to the
evidence presented at trial, Vilar and Tanaka used the proceeds of those
investments for their own personal use, principally to cover Vilar’s
spiraling debts.117 Of central importance to their appeal was that the
primary investment vehicle underlying the section 10(b) charge was
registered under foreign, rather than domestic, law.118 Moreover, nearly
all of the purchases and sales occurred outside the United States so
investors could avoid paying federal taxes.119
4608948 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013); United States v. Mandell, No. 12-cr-1967 (2d Cir. 2012).
113. Brief for Appellant Alberto Vilar at 63, Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948 (Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON)), 2011 WL 4735336; Brief for Appellant Ross H. Mandell at 19,
Mandell, No. 12-cr-1967, 2012 WL 4336737.
114. James B. Stewart, Onward and Upward with the Arts: The Opera Lover, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/13/060213
fa_fact_stewart.
115. Id.
116. Daniel J. Wakin, Music Patron is Convicted of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/arts/music/20vila.html?_r=0ats/music/20vila.html.
117. Trial Transcript at 4609, United States v. Vilar, No. 05-cr-621 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
[hereinafter Vilar Trial Transcript].
118. Brief for Appellant Alberto Vilar, supra note 113, at 65.
119. Id. (“The lion’s share of investors about whom proof was offered at trial did their
purchasing through entities that were specifically designed and organized offshore as part of a
deliberate tax management strategy by the investors.” (citing Vilar Trial Transcript, supra note
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Ross Mandell led a similarly adventurous, albeit less financially
remunerative, existence. In the 1990s, Mandell was the subject of a
front page Wall Street Journal article that noted numerous SEC
complaints against him as well as a six-week suspension by the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).120 While Mandell “seem[ed] to be
thriving” less than a decade later while running a brokerage firm in the
United Kingdom called Sky Capital Holdings,121 his supposed success
turned out to be illusory. In 2009, Mandell was arrested by FBI agents
and charged with several counts of securities fraud related to activities
that occurred between 1998 and 2006.122 The indictment accused him
of engineering a $140 million fraud whose object was the inflation of
Sky Capital Holdings’ stock price.123 Significantly, Sky Capital
Holdings was registered on the London Alternative Investment Index
rather than the NYSE and the majority of Mandell’s victims were
British.124 While charges against Mandell were pending, the Supreme
Court decided Morrison. The government, perhaps fearing a potential
dismissal, amended its indictment to include mail and wire fraud
charges.125 In turn, Mandell made a motion requesting that all of the
charges be dismissed. The lower court rejected that motion, in part
relying on Bowman for the proposition that “the United States is free to
protect its citizens from fraud.”126
The government has gone one step further in both the Vilar and
Mandell appeals by arguing that Morrison ought not apply at all in
criminal prosecutions.127 The Second Circuit unequivocally rejected
117)).
120. Jeffrey Taylor, Art of Survival: How One Stockbroker Keeps on Selling, Despite
Complaints, WALL ST. J., March 14, 1996, at A1.
121. David Serchuk, Wall Street’s “Bad-boy” Broker Ross Mandell is Back with a Flair—
Pushing Stock and Courting Politicians, FORBES, Oct. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/1003/062.html.
122. Six Employees of Sky Capital Are Accused in a $140 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/business/09fraud.html.
123. Indictment, United States v. Mandell, No. 09-cr-662 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009).
124. United States v. Mandell, No. 09-cr-0662, 2011 WL 924891, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2011); Brief for Appellant Ross H. Mandell, supra note 113, at *2.
125. Mandell, 2011 WL 924891, at *3. In adding the mail and wire fraud counts, it appears
the U.S. Attorney’s Office took a hint from Justice Breyer’s Morrison concurrence. Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[W]hile state law or other federal fraud statutes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud), § 1343
(wire fraud), may apply to the fraudulent activity alleged here to have occurred in the United
States, I believe that § 10(b) does not.”).
126. Mandell, 2011 WL 924891, at *5 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922)).
127. A primary point of contention in Vilar and Mandell’s appeals is whether the transactions
at issue were foreign or domestic. Compare Brief for Appellant Ross H. Mandell, supra note
113, at *2, with Brief for the United States of America at 31, United States v. Mandell, No. 09-cr-
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that position in its recently issued opinion in United States v. Vilar,
noting that to do otherwise “would establish the dangerous principle
that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in
different cases.”128 The court particularly faulted the government’s
reliance on Bowman for the proposition that criminal statutes as a class
ought to be exempted from the presumption. “To the contrary,” the
court explained, “no plausible interpretation of Bowman supports this
broad proposition; fairly read, Bowman stands for quite the
opposite.”129
Vilar’s impact on future securities fraud litigation is uncertain
because shortly after Morrison was decided Congress amended section
10(b), ostensibly to permit extraterritorial civil enforcement actions and
criminal prosecutions.130 Yet section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act
speaks in terms of providing federal courts with “extraterritorial
jurisdiction” over such matters,131 whereas Morrison made clear that
the issue was not one of jurisdiction, but instead concerned the statute’s
substantive scope.132 Since the provision was enacted after Vilar and
Tanaka’s convictions, and thus not implicated in their ensuing appeals,
it remains to be seen whether the Second Circuit’s holding in Vilar will
have continued resonance in the securities fraud context.
Where Vilar’s greater significance lies is in its potential to
profoundly alter how courts interpret the extraterritorial reach of
criminal statutes generally, much as Morrison transformed how lower
courts analyze civil statutes. That is because in rejecting the
government’s expansive argument regarding Bowman, the Vilar court
articulated a general rule that encompasses both civil and criminal
statues alike. As such, the decision offers substantial support to
criminal defendants seeking to challenge their indictments or
convictions.
To grasp Vilar’s significance, it is necessary to review the
government’s three principle arguments in support of its position that
0662 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2010), 2012 WL 6811426 [hereinafter United States of America Mandell
Brief]. If the latter, each case would be treated as a traditional securities fraud prosecution and
Morrison would not apply. The resolution of this question, which depends to great extent on the
factual subtleties of each case and the legal definition of a “domestic transaction,” is not our
primary concern here.
128. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL
4608948, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005)).
129. Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948, at *5.
130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
131. Id.
132. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
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section 10(b) authorizes extraterritorial prosecutions. First, it cites the
mistaken, but oft-repeated, notion that “[t]he presumption that ordinary
acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially does not apply to
criminal statutes.”133 In fairness to the government, in two decisions
postdating Morrison, the Second Circuit had itself cited Bowman as
reason to ignore the presumption altogether in criminal cases.134 As
demonstrated elsewhere, such an interpretation represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the presumption’s function.135 For its
part, the Vilar court tempered the “broadly worded” language of prior
Second Circuit opinions by recognizing that Bowman must be
understood in context as creating only a narrow exception in instances
where “the right of the government to defend itself” is directly
implicated.136
The government further argues that applying the presumption in
criminal cases would necessitate a finding that Morrison implicitly
overruled Bowman.137 Since repeals by implication are frowned upon,
the government reasons the presumption should carry no weight in
criminal cases.138 The problem with this analysis is that it creates a
false conflict between the two precedents. Bowman itself explicitly
recognized the presumption’s continuing validity in ordinary criminal
cases.139 As Vilar underscores, Bowman is most faithfully read as
embodying a narrow carve out for instances where the object of a
statute’s text is the protection of U.S. sovereign interests.140
133. United States of America Mandell Brief, supra note 127, at 34 (quoting United States v.
Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011)).
134. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The ordinary presumption
that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes.”); Al Kassar, 660
F.3d at 118 (“The presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially does
not apply to criminal statutes.”).
135. See discussion supra Part I.A.
136. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL
4608948, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (explaining that Siddiqui and Al Kassar are best
understood “in context” as “simply applications of Bowman’s holding”).
137. Brief for the United States of America, Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948 (Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON)) (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 2012), 2012 WL 1076169, at *97–98
[hereinafter United States of America Vilar Brief]; United States of America Mandell Brief,
supra note 127, at 35–36.
138. United States of America Vilar Brief, supra note 137, at *98 (citing Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shaearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490
U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case that directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).
139. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1114 provides such an example. The statute makes it a crime to kill or
attempt to kill “any officer or employee of the United States . . . while such officer or employee is
engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.” One could argue that Bowman
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The government’s final argument is a familiarly functionalist one.
Limiting section 10(b)’s scope, it argues, “would create a broad
immunity for criminal conduct simply because the fraudulent scheme
culminates in a purchase or sale abroad.”141 Such a concern echoes that
raised by Justice Stevens in his Morrison concurrence.142 While the
Morrison majority brushed off the idea that the United States might
become a “Barbary coast” for fraud,143 Justice Stevens identified certain
harms that could accrue to U.S. citizens as a consequence of the
majority’s holding. His critique seems prescient in light of the pending
litigation:
Imagine . . . an American investor who buys shares in a company listed
only on an overseas exchange. That company has a major American
subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it was in New
York City that the executives masterminded and implemented a
massive deception which artificially inflated the stock price—and
which will, upon its disclosure, cause the price to plummet. Or,
imagine that those same executives go knocking on doors in Manhattan
and convince an unsophisticated retiree, on the basis of material
misrepresentations, to invest her life savings in the company’s doomed
securities. Both of these investors would, under the Court’s new test,
be barred from seeking relief under § 10(b).144

Admittedly, Justice Stevens’s concerns are troubling, particularly in
light of the fact that Morrison’s reliance on the presumption against
extraterritoriality does not end the inquiry into a statute’s “focus.”
Because statutes like RICO and section 10(b) “do[] not speak with
geographic precision,”145 courts cannot avoid making difficult lineapplies only to statutes whose “focus” is U.S. personnel or interests and whose commission is
likely to occur overseas, in which case 18 U.S.C. § 1114 probably would not overcome the
presumption. Zachary Clopton suggests courts could adopt an even narrower reading of the case,
one limited to “statutes that protect government contracts from fraud and obstruction.” Clopton,
supra note 63, at 167. This argument, however, may be foreclosed by Bowman itself, specifically
the Court’s reference to other statutes that should similarly be read as having extraterritorial
effect. For instance, the Court cited 4 U.S.C. § 39, which penalized “bribing a United States
officer of the civil, military, or naval service to violate his duty or to aid in committing a fraud on
the United States.” Bowman, 260 U.S. at 99.
141. United States of America Vilar Brief, supra note 137, at *98-99; see also United States
of America Mandell Brief, supra note 127, at 40 (“[A]ccepting the defendants’ argument would
render the criminal securities fraud laws ineffectual against U.S. citizens who commit certain
securities fraud crimes from entirely within this country, creating a veritable safe harbor for
fraudsters who are clever enough to draft securities offerings that would make transactions in the
securities ‘foreign’ under Morrison.”).
142. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring.)
143. Id. at 2886 (majority opinion).
144. Id. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 2894.
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drawing determinations, like whether a securities transaction or criminal
enterprise is domestic or foreign in nature.
Where this Article parts company with Justice Stevens, however, is
his assessment that courts are properly empowered to determine the
substantive scope of federal criminal law. The fact that Morrison’s
interpretive inquiry may result in outcomes that courts find odious is not
a valid justification for fashioning congressional intent where none
exists. And courts are not powerless to alert Congress to errors in
legislative draftsmanship. That is exactly what Judge Jose Cabranes,
the author of the Vilar decision, did in United States v. Gatlin.146 After
deciding that a jurisdictional statute, when read against the presumption,
did not permit the U.S. government to prosecute a defendant accused of
raping a minor on a U.S. military installation overseas, Cabranes
directed his clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the chairmen of
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.147 Congress, in
turn, responded by quickly closing the loophole.148 The proper question
for a court to ask, therefore, is one of institutional competency, not what
Congress might have wished had it thought of a particular problem
beforehand.
In any event, there is a vast literature detailing many persuasive
reasons to resist the expansion of federal criminal law. 149 The point is
simply that Congress is the proper body to decide the issue. For even if
a court could accurately predict what Congress would want, there are
still good reasons to apply the presumption; forcing Congress to

146. 216 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2000).
147. Id. at 209.
148. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267
(2012).
149. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit
the Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 552–53 (2004) (“No matter how many
crimes Congress enacts, it remains for federal prosecutors to decide which statutes to invoke
when proceeding to an indictment. Many of the new crimes serve no other purpose than to make
Congress look good with particular groups and/or on popular issues. . . . The availability of more
crimes also affords the prosecutor more discretion, and, therefore, greater leverage against
defendants.”); Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641,
1642 (2001) (arguing that the pressure to enhance gun penalties has raised constitutional and
prudential concerns, and that “enhancing the penalties under federal law and expanding the range
of cases to which those penalties apply . . . has enhanced the prosecution’s bargaining power and
its unchecked discretion in a wide range of cases”); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 645 (1997) (arguing that the
federalization of criminal law has led to the “dramatically disparate treatment of similarly situated
offenders”); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited—the Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 274 (1973) (arguing that the federalization of intrastate crime
“extend[s] the commerce power beyond previous limits”).
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verbalize its intentions both familiarizes congressional representatives
with the consequences of their votes and increases the legitimacy of
enacted legislation.
The outcome of the Vilar litigation should further temper fears
concerning the likelihood of a parade of horribles. While the
defendants achieved victory on the threshold issue of Morrison’s
applicability to section 10(b) criminal prosecutions, the court
nonetheless upheld their convictions after finding that they had engaged
in sufficient domestic conduct to bring their actions within the statute’s
prohibitions.150 Specifically, the court invoked a test it had previously
articulated for determining whether a securities transaction was
domestic or extraterritorial in nature. According to that test, a
transaction is domestic if title passes or a purchaser or seller incurs
“irrevocable liability” to transfer title to a security within the territorial
United States.151 Because some of the transactions at issue in Vilar and
Tanaka’s alleged scheme satisfied this test,152 the court elected to
uphold their convictions. It did so notwithstanding the possibility that
“in responding to a carefully drawn special verdict form, the jury would
have found Vilar and Tanaka guilty only of defrauding victims outside
of the United States.”153 The court also indicated, however, that the
scheme’s collateral connections to the United States, including the
mailing of marketing materials to U.S. customers, domestic wire
transactions, and the use of a U.S. firm as the firm’s custodian, would
not have sufficed to bring it within section 10(b)’s reach.154
Vilar represents an important affirmation of the presumption’s
applicability to criminal statutes. Yet it leaves many questions
unanswered. While the decision establishes the burden the government
must overcome to establish a domestic securities transaction for the
purpose of securing a criminal conviction, it offers no general method
of determining the predominant locus of criminal conduct outside the
section 10(b) context. Nor does it offer any indication as to the kinds of
contextual evidence that may be sufficient to overcome the presumption
when applied to other criminal statutes. Instead, in a fashion consistent
with Morrison and Kiobel’s teachings, Vilar suggests lower courts must
analyze statutes on a case-by-case basis to determine whether particular
150. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL
4608948, at *10–*11 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013).
151. Id. at *9 (citing Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
152. Id. at *10–*11.
153. Id. at *10.
154. Id. at * 9 n.10.
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extraterritorial applications “are the objects of [a] statute’s
solicitude.”155 To that end, in the following Sections we examine two
areas of law—criminal RICO and 18 U.S.C. §924(c)—where courts
have already begun to engage in that process.
B. RICO
This Section confronts the difficulties that lower courts have
encountered when asked to apply RICO in a post-Morrison world.
Congress passed RICO in 1970 after lengthy public hearings.156 The
statute’s purpose was to eradicate “organized crime,” the activities of
which Congress found to “weaken the stability of the Nation’s
economic system, harm innocent investors and competing
organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and
undermine the general welfare.”157 Although originally directed at the
mafia’s infiltration of legitimate businesses, RICO has since been
applied to a variety of organizations and activities, both foreign and
domestic.158
Prior to Morrison, courts routinely upheld extraterritorial
“jurisdiction” over RICO offenses using the same conducts-and-effects
test employed in section 10(b) cases.159 That is, courts asked whether
the alleged racketeering activity occurred in, or had substantial effects
upon, the United States sufficient to warrant a court’s exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction. Under this framework, courts had no
occasion to ask whether the alleged criminal enterprise was domestic or
foreign. So long as the activities complained of occurred in or had
effects on the United States, extraterritorial application of RICO seemed
consistent with both Due Process and legislative intent.160
155. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
156. 18 U.S.C. §§1961–1964 (2012).
157. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922–23 (1970).
158. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 661 (1987) (noting RICO’s “broad draftsmanship, which has left it open to a wide
range of applications, not all of which were foreseen or intended by the Congress that enacted
it”); id. at 662 (“Congress viewed RICO principally as a tool for attacking the specific problem of
infiltration of legitimate business by organized criminal syndicates. As such, RICO has hardly
been a dramatic success.”).
159. R. Davis Mello, Note, Life After Morrison: Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1385, 1387 n.12 (2011) (adopting the “widely accepted view . . . that RICO may
apply extraterritorially if conduct material to the completion of the racketeering occurs in the
United States, or if significant effects of the racketeering are felt here” (quoting Liquidation
Comm’n of Banco Intercont’l, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2008))).
160. Some courts reached this decision almost reflexively, whereas other courts engaged in a
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Morrison upended this analysis. Although Justice Scalia’s opinion
did not mention RICO by name, every court that has considered the
statute’s application since Morrison has found that it lacks
extraterritorial effect.161 Indeed, these decisions follow logically from
pre-Morrison holdings that RICO’s text is silent as to its extraterritorial
reach.162 Constrained by these prior holdings and Morrison’s logic,
both the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that RICO does not apply
extraterritorially, though they have differed on precisely what this
means in practice.163
Two interpretive questions guide the analysis that follows. First,
recognizing that the majority of post-Morrison RICO decisions involve
civil claims, this Article asks whether courts should interpret RICO’s
scope congruently when applied in a criminal prosecution. Second, it
asks what Congress’s “focus” was in enacting RICO—the criminal
enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity.
The first question ought to be easily resolved. Since RICO’s criminal
and civil penalty provisions are premised on the same substantive
conduct, they ought to be interpreted consistently. 164 Put slightly
differently, to ask what conduct RICO reaches is to ask what conduct it
prohibits, not what penalties may be imposed in a civil or criminal
action. In this sense, the analysis is no different than that which applies
in the section 10(b) context. Nor is a Bowman argument more
persuasive here—both section 10(b) and RICO are concerned with
conduct that harms private actors or society generally rather than U.S.

searching discussion of what Congress intended. Compare Renta, 530 F.3d at 1351–52 (quoted
above), with Butte Min. PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We do not suppose that
Congress in enacting RICO had the purpose of punishing frauds by aliens abroad even if
peripheral preparations were undertaken by them here.”), and N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100
F.3d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting same).
161. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster
Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938–40 (N.D. Cal. 2012); CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens,
824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1209–10 (D. Colo. 2011); Farm Credit Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Krones,
Inc. (In re Le–Nature’s, Inc.), No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 n.7 (W.D. Pa. May 26,
2011); In re Toyota, 785 F. Supp. 2d, 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011); United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2011); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02CV-5771, 2011 WL 84395, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); Cedeno v. Intech Group, Inc., 733 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 472–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
162. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004) (“RICO itself is silent
as to its extraterritorial application.”); Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1051 (“The RICO statute is silent as
to any extraterritorial application.”).
163. Compare Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 976 (finding the pattern of racketeering activity to be
RICO’s focus), with Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010)
(limiting Morrison to domestic conduct but declining to specify RICO’s focus).
164. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2012) (criminal penalties), with id. § 1964 (civil remedies).
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sovereign interests.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has taken a contrary position. In
Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., a civil RICO case, a
Second Circuit panel held that RICO has no extraterritorial
application.165 The U.S. Attorney’s Office, concerned by the effect this
decision would have on criminal prosecutions, took the somewhat
unusual step of requesting a limited rehearing en banc so the panel
could clarify that its decision did not apply to criminal RICO
prosecutions.166 Specifically, it argued for an expansive reading of the
Bowman exception and warned that:
An overbroad reading of Morrison would potentially undercut
government enforcement not only of RICO, but also of other
provisions. For example, applying a rigid “presumption against
extraterritoriality,” without consideration of the specific statute and
context at issue, could impair non-RICO criminal conspiracy
prosecutions in cases related to international terrorism, narcotrafficking, arms-trafficking, and organized crime, where much of the
underlying conduct may have occurred abroad. It could also impair
government enforcement under statutes arising in other areas,
including taxation and protection of the environment.167

The Norex plaintiffs themselves never requested a rehearing en banc.
Moreover, because the case involved a civil matter, neither the plaintiffs
nor the defendants had reason to oppose the government’s request.168
The Second Circuit panel obliged the government by amending its
opinion without even scheduling a hearing. The revised opinion
included the following disclaimer: “Because Norex brought a private
lawsuit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), we have no occasion to
address—and express no opinion on—the extraterritorial application of
RICO when enforced by the government pursuant to §§ 1962, 1963,
1964(a) and (b).”169 Hence, by modifying its decision in this way, the
Second Circuit panel implicitly deferred to the government’s continued
reliance on RICO in extraterritorial prosecutions.
The only court since Morrison to squarely address whether criminal
RICO applies extraterritorially found that it did not, consistent with the
165. Norex, 631 F.3d at 33.
166. United States as Amicus Norex Brief, supra note 62.
167. Id. at 7 n.8.
168. Even the government’s motion for rehearing acknowledged as much, though the panel
opinion strikingly did not. See id. at 2 (“[A]lthough Norex has not sought panel rehearing, that
would not preclude the panel from simply amending its opinion sua sponte to account for these
concerns set forth in this brief.”).
169. Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010), amended and
superseded, 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010).
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foregoing analysis. In that case, United States v. Chao Fan Xu, the
Ninth Circuit did not even go to the trouble of addressing the
government’s Bowman argument.170 Instead, it simply began “with a
presumption that RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a civil or
criminal context.”171 Doing so, it reasoned, was “faithful to Morrison’s
rationale,” which it understood as a desire to construct a stable
background of interpretative rules against which Congress can
legislate.172
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is also instructive, however, in
illustrating the difficulty courts have sometimes encountered in
determining a statute’s “focus” as Morrison directs them to do. In the
RICO context, there are two possible objects of congressional focus: the
criminal enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity. To see why
this matters, consider the facts of Chao Fan Xu. The defendants in that
case were four Chinese nationals convicted under RICO for engaging in
a scheme to defraud the Bank of China by diverting bank funds to a
holding company in Hong Kong.173 The defendants subsequently used
those funds “to speculate in foreign currency, to make fraudulent loans,
to purchase real estate in Asia and North America, and to finance
gambling trips to Las Vegas and other casino venues.”174 Though the
fraud’s primary victim was a foreign bank and nearly all the fraudulent
activity occurred overseas, the scheme’s success depended on each
defendant’s decision to enter into a sham marriage with a U.S. citizen or
Green Card holder.175 Doing so ultimately enabled them to evade
Chinese law enforcement by fleeing to the United States.176
In assessing whether the defendants’ conduct constituted a crime
punishable under RICO, the Ninth Circuit noted post-Morrison
disagreement among lower courts over whether RICO’s principal focus
is on the criminal enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity.177
Ultimately, the court concluded that RICO’s focus was on the
racketeering activity and not the criminal enterprise, and it accordingly
upheld the convictions of the defendants.178 The court purported to

170. Brief of the United States at 45–48, United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965 (9th
Cir. 2013) (09-10189).
171. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 974–75.
172. Id. at 974 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010)).
173. Id. at 972.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 975–76.
178. Id. at 979.
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premise its decision on RICO’s text and Congress’ intent as expressed
through the statute’s legislative history. It noted for instance, that
RICO’s statement of purpose indicated that the statute was intended to
promote “the eradication of organized crime . . . by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in crime.”179 Consequently, the Court concluded, “it is highly
unlikely that Congress was unconcerned with the actions of foreign
enterprises where those actions violated the laws of this country while
the defendants were in this country.”180
While the Ninth Circuit asked the right question, its ultimate
conclusion was erroneous.
The more compelling argument, as
expressed by several district courts, is that RICO’s focus concerns
criminal enterprises.181 That is because the reasoning of those courts
mirrors that of Morrison, which noted that “§ 10(b) does not punish
deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered.’”182 Similarly, RICO does
not punish racketeering activity, “but only racketeering activity in
connection with an ‘enterprise.’”183 It seems clear, then, that the
criminal enterprise is “the object[] of the statute’s solicitude.”184 Or, as
one district court has explained, “RICO . . . seeks to regulate
‘enterprises’ by protecting them from being victimized by or conducted
through racketeering activity.”185
Ironically, the Ninth Circuit declined to define RICO’s focus as the
criminal enterprise for largely functionalist reasons. The irony lies in
the court’s doing so while also claiming fidelity to Morrison, a decision
that eschewed functionalist concerns for an approach grounded in
textualist premises. The Ninth Circuit’s primary objection to adopting
the enterprise as the statute’s focus was its perception that
“[d]etermining the geographic location of an enterprise—whether

179. Id. at 978 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and
Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073
(emphasis added)).
180. Id. at 978.
181. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933,
938–40 (N.D. Cal. 2012); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011 WL
843957, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); Cedeno v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473–74
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
182. European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)).
183. Id.
184. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
185. European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5.
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foreign or domestic—is a difficult inquiry.”186 Specifically, the court
objected to the “nerve center” test employed by many lower courts.187
This test, which asks where the enterprise’s decisions are conceived
rather than carried out, “could lead to ‘artificially simplified results.’”188
For instance, if followed, the nerve center test would result in a
domestic corporation being held liable under RICO whereas “[a] foreign
corporation would be immune from prosecution simply because its
ringleaders had the forethought to incorporate overseas.”189
The court’s decision, of course, neglects the many reasons why
Congress might have declined to give prosecutors the power to bring
charges against those accused of hatching conspiracies abroad. But it
also bears repeating that under Morrison and Kiobel such functionalist
concerns carry little weight. As the Morrison Court made clear, “The
results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what Congress
would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—
demonstrate
the
wisdom
of
the
presumption
against
190
extraterritorially.”
There is no evidence that Congress ever
considered, let alone embraced, RICO’s potential application to foreign
defendants whose criminal enterprise was concocted overseas in an
effort to defraud a foreign bank, and whose illegal domestic conduct
was largely incidental to that scheme’s success. Rather than guess at
what Congress would have preferred, “[a] more natural inquiry might be
what . . . Congress in fact thought about and conferred.”191
C. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
RICO and section 10(b) are both statutes that have criminal and civil
components. Such statutes must be read consistently regardless of their
application. But Morrison also embodies a general admonition to courts
about how they should interpret all federal statutes. Here, we consider
Morrison’s application to a statute that has no civil corollary: 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c).
Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) makes the possession or use of a gun during
a “crime of violence” or drug trafficking crime a distinct offense.192
186. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2013).
187. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933,
940–43 (N.D. Cal. 2012); European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6.
188. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977 (quoting Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 871 F. Supp. 2d at
940).
189. Id. (citing Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
190. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
191. Id. at 2880 (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).
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The statute provides prosecutors with a powerful tool because § 924(c)
includes lengthy mandatory minimum sentences.193 For instance, a
defendant convicted of possessing an assault rifle such as an AK-47
faces a minimum prison sentence of thirty years upon conviction.194
Consequently, prosecutors gain tremendous leverage in plea
negotiations and the government is rarely put to its proof. Instead,
defendants typically choose to plead guilty to lesser charges or offer to
cooperate in exchange for dismissal of the § 924(c) counts.195 And
because the U.S. Attorney’s standard form plea agreement requires that
defendants waive their right to appeal, the application of § 924(c) to
foreign defendants is largely immunized from appellate review.196
In a series of recent cases, foreign nationals arrested overseas have
argued that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) does not reach extraterritorial weapons
possession. So far, that argument has failed to gain traction.197 A
clearer articulation of the presumption’s applicability to criminal
statutes by the Second Circuit in Vilar and Mandell, however, could
change how district courts look at § 924(c). The stakes for foreign
nationals charged with violating U.S. laws could not be higher. Put
simply, in many instances it could mean the difference between
pleading guilty or going to trial. Under the law as it is currently
interpreted, defendants simply cannot take the risk of incurring lengthy
mandatory prison sentences.
This Section begins with an analysis of § 924(c)’s text, history, and
structure. Congress enacted the statute as a response to the problem of
increasing domestic gun violence in the 1960s, prompted in part by the
assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Regardless of the
significance one is inclined to attach to that history, the presumption
against extraterritoriality ought to bar § 924(c)’s application abroad.
Nowhere does the statute’s ambiguous text evince a “clear indication”
that Congress intended for it to punish the use or possession of a firearm
193. Id. §924(c)(1)(A)–(C) (authorizing mandatory minimums of five to thirty years).
194. Id.
195. The DOJ is explicit about its policy. See 9 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 112
(1997) (“Firearms violations should be aggressively used in prosecuting violent crime. They are
generally simple and quick to prove. The mandatory and enhanced punishments for many
firearms violations can be used as leverage to gain plea bargaining and cooperation from
offenders.”).
196. On the issue of appeal waivers, see generally Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill,
Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209 (2005) (analyzing the
details, benefits, costs, and ethics behind many forms of appeal waivers).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) (explicitly rejecting
this argument); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 814 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); United States
v. Ahmed, No. 10-cr-131, 2012 WL 983545, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (same); United
States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same).
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overseas.
Next, this Section considers the various rationales lower courts have
fashioned for extending § 924(c)’s reach. None of these rationales is
persuasive. For instance, several courts have adopted a plain meaning
approach towards the statute by misinterpreting Bowman to exempt all
criminal laws from the presumption. More plausibly, some courts have
analogized § 924(c) to crimes like conspiracy, reasoning that the statute
is merely an ancillary one whose scope Congress intended courts to
derive from underlying predicate crimes. As this Section explains, that
analogy is unpersuasive for several reasons, not the least of which is
that § 924(c) is not merely a penalty enhancement that punishes the
manner of committing a crime, but a substantive offense in its own right
that prohibits a specific kind of conduct.
1. Applying the Presumption to § 924(c)
It is easy to see why a court, when presented with § 924(c)’s
seemingly straightforward text, would fail to discern a problem with
applying the statute abroad. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides in relevant
part:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall . . . [listing
penalties].198

The statute consists of two basic elements: (i) using, carrying, or
possessing a firearm; (ii) during, in relation, or in furtherance of certain
enumerated drug and violent crimes that “may be prosecuted in a court
of the United States.” As one court has noted, “[o]n its face, there is
simply no limitation in the language of the statute concerning its
application to crimes committed outside of the United States.”199 And
because U.S. law prohibits certain drug trafficking offenses and crimes
of violence that occur abroad,200 a fact of which Congress was
presumably aware at the time it enacted (or amended) the statute, §
924(c) would seem to penalize the extraterritorial possession or use of
firearms in certain specified instances. Or so the argument goes.
That argument, however, entirely disregards the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Upon applying that canon, the import of the text
198. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
199. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 814.
200. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 81 (arson); id. § 1111 (murder); id. § 1201 (kidnapping); 21 U.S.C.
§ 959 (2012) (illicit drug importation); id. § 960a (narco-terrorism); 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70507
(2012) (drugs aboard vessels).

TAKING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY SERIOUSLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/13/2014 1:16 PM

2013] Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously

109

becomes much less clear. To begin, consider the statute’s first term,
“any person.” As the Supreme Court has noted, it is not always proper
to give the term “any” its literal meaning. For instance, “In ordinary
life, a speaker who says, ‘I’ll see any film,’ may or may not mean to
include films shown in another city.”201 Likewise, “In law, a legislature
that uses the statutory phrase ‘any person’ may or may not mean to
include ‘persons’ outside the jurisdiction of the state.”202 And while
“[t]he words ‘any person or persons,’ are broad enough to comprehend
every human being” those words “must not only be limited to cases
within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the
legislature intended to apply them.”203 That is how the Supreme Court
has in fact interpreted federal criminal laws since at least 1818 when it
declined to find statutory authority for the prosecution of a foreign
national for robbery on the high seas.204 As Morrison and Kiobel
underscore, absent a “clear indication” by Congress otherwise, federal
statutes do not have extraterritorial effect.205
While it is true that the Supreme Court has interpreted the word
“any” broadly when considering the domestic application of a separate
§ 924(c) provision,206 it has repeatedly cautioned lower courts against
doing the same when determining the extraterritorial scope of federal
statutes. In Foley Brothers v. Filardo, for example, the Court rejected
the plaintiff’s attempt to sue for labor violations abroad under an act
providing that “[e]very contract made to which the United States . . . is a
party . . . shall contain a provision that no laborer . . . shall be required
or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day.”207
The Court did so based on the “normal” assumption that Congress is

201. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005).
202. Id.
203. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818).
204. Id.
205. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013) (quoting Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010)).
206. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1997). In Gonzales, the Court was tasked
with interpreting the following § 924(c) language: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a
violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment . . . .” Defendant plausibly claimed that
Congress intended the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” to refer only to federal sentences.
Justice O’Connor, writing on behalf of the majority, disagreed. She noted that “[r]ead naturally,
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning,” and because “Congress did not add any language
limiting the breadth of that word,” the Court “must read § 924(c) as referring to all ‘term[s] of
imprisonment,’ including those imposed by state courts.” Id. at 5.
207. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 324 (repealed
1962)).
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“primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”208 Reviewing the
legislative history, the Court found that the “insertion of the word
‘every’ was designed to remedy a misinterpretation according to which
the Act did not apply to work performed on private property by
government contractors.”209 In contrast, “[n]othing . . . support[ed] the
conclusion . . . that ‘every contract’ must of necessity, by virtue of the
broadness of the language, include contracts for work to be performed
in foreign countries.”210
The table below demonstrates the Court’s longstanding practice of
invoking the presumption to considerably narrow similarly broad
language. The examples cited therein, while not exhaustive, suffice to
show that general terms predictably lose their expansive meaning when
the presumption is properly applied.
Case

Statutory Language

[I]f any person or persons shall commit,
upon the high seas . . . murder or robbery, or
any other offence, which, if committed
United States v. within the body of a county, would, by the
Palmer, 16 U.S. laws of the United States, be punishable
610 (1818)
with death . . . every such offender shall be
deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate
and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall
suffer death . . . .

Interpretation
Held not to apply
to foreign
nationals
committing
robbery on the
high seas aboard
foreign vessels

Sandberg v.
That it shall be . . . unlawful in any case to
Held not to apply
McDonald, 248 pay any seaman wages in advance of the
to foreign seamen
U.S. 185 (1918) time when he has actually earned the same.
Every contract made to which the United
States . . . is a party . . . shall contain a
provision that no laborer or mechanic doing
Foley Bros. v.
any part of the work contemplated by the
Filardo, 336
contract, in the employ of the contractor or
U.S. 281 (1949)
any subcontractor . . . shall be required or
permitted to work more than eight hours in
any one calendar day upon such work . . . .

208. Id. at 285.
209. Id. at 287.
210. Id.

Held not to apply
to contracts
between federal
government and
private
contractors
abroad
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The term “industry affecting commerce”
EEOC v.
means any activity, business, or industry in
Arabian Am.
commerce or in which a labor dispute would
Oil Co., 499
hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow
U.S. 244 (1991)
of commerce . . . .

Held not to apply
to foreign
corporations
operating abroad

The Attorney General shall not deport or
return any alien . . . to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened
in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular
group, or political opinion.

Held not to apply
to aliens detained
in international
waters while
attempting to
enter U.S.
territory

Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S.
155 (1993)

It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who
Small v. United has been convicted in any court of, a crime Held not to apply
States, 544 U.S. punishable by imprisonment for a term to convictions in
385 (2005)
exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess . . . foreign courts
any firearm.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ,
Morrison v.
in connection with the purchase or sale of
Nat’l Austl.
any security registered on a national
Bank, 130 S.
securities exchange or any security not so
Ct. 2869 (2010)
registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [Securities
and
Exchange]
Commission
may
prescribe . . . .

Held not to apply
to securities
issued on foreign
exchanges

Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch
Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013)

Held not to allow
civil actions for
torts committed
abroad

The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.

The Supreme Court has not had occasion to specifically consider
whether § 924(c) encompasses extraterritorial conduct. But its
interpretation of the substantive reach of a parallel provision is highly
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instructive. In Small v. United States, the petitioner, Gary Small,
appealed his conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the socalled felon-in-possession statute.211 Section 922(g), which, like §
924(c), was passed as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, makes it a
crime for “any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime publishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .
to . . . possess . . . any firearm.”212 Small, whose predicate conviction
was for attempting to illegally smuggle several firearms into Japan, had
been sentenced by a Japanese court to five years’ imprisonment.213
When he returned to the United States, he purchased a gun from a
Pennsylvania firearms dealer, which was recovered during a routine
parole search.214 Small eventually entered a conditional guilty plea
while preserving his right to challenge the conviction.215
Strictly speaking, Small did not involve a question of extraterritorial
application of federal law at all. As the dissent protested, “In
prosecuting Small, the Government [was] enforcing a domestic criminal
statute to punish domestic criminal conduct.”216 The government had
similarly argued in its brief that the “presumption . . . has no application
here” since “922(g)(1) does not regulate conduct on foreign
territory.”217 But the majority believed the principles behind the
presumption were nonetheless relevant, particularly the notion that
“Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”218 In
light of this “commonsense notion,” the Court declined to read the
phrase “convicted in any court” to encompass foreign convictions.219
Although Small produced a five-three split, of particular significance
is the majority’s uncontroverted assertion that although the presumption
did not apply “directly” to Small’s case, it “would apply . . . were [the
Court] to consider whether this statute prohibits unlawful gun
possession abroad as well as domestically.”220 That language is more
than mere dicta. It is a conclusion both consistent with the text of the
dissent, which acknowledged that the presumption operates to “restrict
federal statutes from applying outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
211. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005).
212. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
213. Small, 544 U.S. at 387.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
217. Brief for Respondent at 44 n.31, Small, 544 U.S. 385 (No. 03-750).
218. Small, 544 U.S. at 388 (majority opinion) (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
203 (1993)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 389.
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United States,”221 and consistent with the identities of the dissent’s
signatories, a group that included Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy, all three of whom subscribed to the Morrison and Kiobel
majority opinions.
It seems likely, then, that a majority of the Court, and quite possibly a
unanimous majority, would view the felon-in-possession statute as
applying to domestic possession only. That is significant because it,
like § 924(c), depends on the commission of a predicate crime. But
assumptions as to how the Court would rule if faced with determining
the extraterritorial application of the felon-in-possession statute, while
instructive, cannot resolve whether § 924(c) applies to a person who
uses or possesses a gun overseas. That is because § 924(c)’s reference
to “any person” is qualified by the language that follows, i.e. “for which
the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.” In other
words, Congress appears to have been quite specific in identifying the
class of individuals whom it sought to punish.
That Congress intended to punish those who carry or use a weapon
during the commission of a federal (as opposed to state) crime,
however, says nothing about whether Congress meant for the law to
apply outside the United States. To put it in Morrison’s and Kiobel’s
terms, there is no “affirmative indication” that the statute applies
extraterritorially.222 It is at this point that Morrison and Kiobel provide
an opening to consider “context,” by which the Court presumably
means a statute’s history, structure, and purpose.223
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as part of the Gun Control Act
of 1968 in the wake of the Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F.
Kennedy assassinations.224 According to the report of the House
conference committee, Congress’s primary purpose in passing the Act
was to “respond[] to widespread national concern that existing Federal
control over the sale and shipment of firearms [across] State lines [was]
grossly inadequate.”225 To this end, the title of the Act was “An act to
amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for better control of the
interstate traffic in firearms” and section 1 specifically provided for
221. Id. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
222. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“For us to run
interference in . . . a delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed.” (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A.,
353 U. S. 138, 147 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank,
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
223. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
224. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 942(c) (2012)).
225. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 1047 (1968) (Conf. Rep.) (brackets in original), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4413.
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“State Firearms Control Assistance.”226
The Senate Report offers further confirmation of domestic gun
violence as the “object[] of the statute’s solicitude.”227 The report noted
that, “[i]n 1967, 7,700 citizens were murdered by gunmen in the United
States, and 71,000 Americans were victims of armed robberies and
55,000 persons were assaulted by means of firearms. Thus, in 1967,
134,000 American citizens were victimized by gun violence in the
United States.”228 The Senate report did not include any mention of
Americans harmed overseas. Even the sponsor of the most recent
amendment to § 924(c), enacted in 1998, boasted that the amendment’s
passage represented “an important step in the battle against firearm
violence in America.”229
The language of § 924(c) as originally enacted applied to an even
broader category of criminal activity than it does today. Rather than
prohibiting the use of weapons in connection with certain kinds of
felonies, i.e. enumerated drug offenses and crimes of violence, the
statute simply punished whoever “use[d] a firearm to commit any felony
which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.”230
To understand why Congress adopted this particular statutory
formulation, some historical context is necessary. Section 924(c) was
not included in the original Gun Control bill, but was instead introduced
as an amendment on the House floor by Representative Robert Casey of
Texas. Casey’s original amendment would have punished “whoever
during the commission of any robbery, assault, murder, rape, burglary,
kidnapping, or homicide (other than involuntary manslaughter), uses or
carries any firearm which has been transported in interstate or foreign
commerce . . . .”231 Had it passed, Casey’s amendment would have
dramatically expanded the federal government’s intrusion into matters
traditionally entrusted to states as part of their general police power.
That concern is what prompted Representative Richard Poff of Virginia
to suggest a much narrower alternative amendment, which applied to
“whoever uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States.”232 As Poff explained when introducing

226. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
227. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
228. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968) (emphasis added), available at
https://bulk.resource.org/gao/90-618/000051AF.pdf.
229. 144 CONG. REC. 1715 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum) (emphasis added).
230. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1224 (1968) (emphasis
added).
231. H.R. 18298, 90th Cong. (1968).
232. This became the eventual language of the statute. Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat.
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his revised language:
[A]s a matter of policy, I do not think I would be wise to convert State
crimes into Federal crimes on such a massive scale. The Constitution
reserves the police powers to the several States. What is at issue is the
proper function of the federal system. What is at stake is the concept
of dual sovereignties. What is involved is the danger of centralized
police powers.233

Consequently, the phrase “may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States” was inserted in order to differentiate federal from state crimes.
The ensuing debate makes clear that other members shared Poff’s
concern.234 In contrast, there is absolutely no hint in the legislative
record that Congress even considered § 924(c)’s potential
extraterritorial application, nor would they have thought to since the
number of federal crimes that had been applied extraterritorially at the
time was miniscule.
The point can be put slightly differently: suppose Representative
Casey’s original amendment had passed, making it a crime to use a
firearm during one of the enumerated felonies so long as that firearm
had been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Such a statute
clearly would not apply to the use of a firearm extraterritorially. That is
because the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that even statutes that
contain broad language in their definitions of ‘commerce’ that expressly
refer to ‘foreign commerce’ do not apply abroad.”235 If this is correct, it
would require a leap of logic to infer that Representative Hoff’s
substitute amendment, introduced for the sole purpose of cabining the
statute’s scope by differentiating federal from state crimes, in fact
expanded the substantive reach of the statute to encompass acts
committed abroad.
One final point concerning the phrase “may be prosecuted in a court
of the United States” bears mentioning. The same language appears in
other sections of the U.S. Criminal Code. For instance, the phrase
appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b), which concerns sentences of probation
for domestic violence offenders. The relevant provision reads: “A
defendant who has been convicted for the first time of a domestic
violence crime shall be sentenced to a term or probation if not sentenced
to a term of imprisonment. The term ‘domestic violence crime’ means a
1213, 1224 (Oct. 22, 1968).
233. 114 CONG. REC. 22, 231–32 (1968) (statement of Rep. Richard Poff).
234. Id. at 22, 231.
235. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991) (emphasis in original) (citing
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925)); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
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crime for which the defendant may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States . . . .”236 There is some support for the idea, then, that the
phrase is mere “boilerplate language” that should not be read to expand
the substantive reach of the statute.237
The existence of these other statutes and the legislative history of §
924(c) suggest that the operative language is jurisdictional in nature.
That is to say, it defines federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.
Wherever the predicate offenses are enumerated felonies, a federal court
necessarily enjoys jurisdiction over the “case,” including the authority
to decide whether the conduct at issue is punishable under § 924(c).
But acknowledging this truth says nothing of the extraterritorial scope
of § 924(c) itself. As Morrison recognized, “to ask what conduct [a
statute] reaches is to ask what conduct [it] prohibits. Subject-matter
jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”238
Seen in this light, the “for which a person may be prosecuted” language
merely recognizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over the “case.” It does
not speak to conduct that the statute prohibits.
Finally, the conclusion that Congress did not intend § 924(c) to apply
extraterritorially is buttressed by a general review of the statute’s
overall structure. As the Court found in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
with respect to Title VII, “[t]he statute as a whole indicates a concern
that it not unduly interfere with the sovereignty and laws of the
States.”239 Other provisions make clear that Congress was primarily
concerned with firearms transportation to and between States.
For example, while the Gun Control Act reflects congressional
concern over potential conflicts between federal and state law, the
statute is silent as to the relationship between federal and foreign law.
Section 924(i) penalizes violations of § 922(u), which prohibits thefts
from the inventory of gun dealers, manufacturers, and importers.
Section 924(i)(2) notes that
[n]othing contained in this subsection shall be construed as indicating
an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which
provisions of this subsection operate to the exclusion of State laws on
the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this subsection be
construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this
subsection.240
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 251.
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 255.
18 U.S.C. § 924(i)(2).
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Congress presumably would have at least mentioned potential conflicts
with the laws of foreign countries had it considered § 924(c)’s potential
extraterritorial application. In fact, there is an entire section of the Act,
18 U.S.C. § 927, devoted to its “Effect on State Law.”241 The Arabian
American Oil Court made a similar point, noting that “[i]t is . . .
reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended Title VII to apply
overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign
laws and procedures.”242
Many of the penalty provisions of § 924 were drafted in such a way
as to foreclose the possibility of extraterritorial application. Section
924(g), for instance, prohibits the act of acquiring a weapon for use in a
crime of violence. Significantly, however, the statute’s literal terms do
not authorize conviction for someone who travels for the purpose of
acquiring a weapon outside of the United States. It reads:
Whoever, with the intent to engage in conduct which . . . (4)
constitutes a crime of violence . . . travels from any State or foreign
country into any other State and acquires . . . a firearm in such other
State in furtherance of such purpose, shall be imprisoned not more
than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.243

If Congress had intended § 924 to apply extraterritorially, presumably
it would have eliminated the locus language altogether or substituted
“into any other foreign country” for “into any other State.” Instead,
Congress was sensibly focused on violence in the United States.
Section 924(k) similarly penalizes the act of smuggling a weapon into
the United States for the purpose of committing a crime of violence; it
does not criminalize smuggling a weapon out of the U.S. for the
purpose of committing a crime of violence abroad.244 Finally, § 922
describes several “unlawful acts” under the Gun Control Act—
importation, exportation, unlicensed disposal, and possession—with no
mention of extraterritorial application.245
Before moving on to an analysis of how courts have addressed §
924(c)’s extraterritorial reach, a final point bears mentioning. One
might be tempted to suppose that the subject matter of § 924(c) offers
the requisite “context” to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality. After all, drug trafficking offenses frequently involve
extraterritorial conduct. It is not implausible therefore that Congress
was thinking extraterritorially when it added “drug trafficking” to the
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. § 927.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 256.
18 U.S.C. § 924(g) (emphasis added).
Id. § 924(k).
See generally id. § 922.
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statute in 1986.246 But this argument proves too much. It is not enough
to say that the crime at issue often involves extraterritorial conduct.
There must be some “affirmative indication” that such conduct was the
object of Congress’s concern. The legislative history of the 1986
amendment provides no such indication.
2. The Unwarranted Expansion of § 924(c)
To date, only two appeals courts have addressed § 924(c)’s
extraterritorial application.247 Both have determined that the statute
prohibits firearms offenses committed abroad. The justifications for
these holdings, however, are seriously flawed.
In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the convictions of Roy
Belfast. Belfast, the American son of former Liberian president Charles
Taylor, was the first person to be indicted and convicted under the
Torture Act.248 At trial, the government proved that Belfast had
participated in and directed a number of atrocities during his father’s
presidency, including multiple murders. In addition to being convicted
of acts of torture, Belfast was found guilty of violating § 924(c). All of
the charged conduct, including Belfast’s use of a weapon, occurred
entirely in Liberia.
In addressing Belfast’s argument that § 924(c) does not proscribe
extraterritorial conduct, the Eleventh Circuit postulated that
“extraterritorial application can be inferred in certain cases even absent
an express intention on the face of the statute.”249 For this proposition
the court cited Bowman. The court further explained its interpretation
of Bowman’s meaning:
Crimes fall under the Bowman exception when limiting their locus to
the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope
and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for
frauds as easily committed by citizens in foreign countries as at home.
Thus, we have upheld extraterritorial application of statutes where the
nature of the activities warranted a broad sweep of power.250

As is true with section 10(b) and RICO, the court of appeals’ reading
of Bowman would effectively extraterritorialize the entire U.S. Criminal
Code. That is not what Bowman says, of course, nor does it reflect
246. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2), 100 Stat. 449, 456–57 (1986) (codified as 18 U.S.C. §
921 (2012)).
247. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Belfast, 611
F.3d 783, 814 (11th Cir. 2010).
248. 18 U.S.C. § 2340–2340A.
249. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 813 (quoting United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir.
2010)).
250. Id. at 814 (quoting Frank, 599 F.3d at 1230).
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Congress’s clearly expressed intent. As one district court correctly
noted in rejecting a similarly expansive interpretation offered by the
government, “§ 924(c) criminalizes conduct that does not directly
victimize the United States. All crime can harm the United States
indirectly, but it does not follow that all federal criminal statutes apply
extraterritorially based on the Government’s need to ‘defend itself.’”251
The Eleventh Circuit went on to note that “the plain language of §
924(c) demonstrates that Congress intended the provision to apply to
any acts that, under other legislation, may be prosecuted in federal
courts.”252 Of course, this “plain language” approach ignores both the
presumption and the legislative history that demonstrates Congress’s
overriding concern was to differentiate federal from state crimes.
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of § 924(c) is particularly
perplexing given the court’s acknowledgement of Morrison with respect
to the Torture Act, a statute whose extraterritorial application is, as the
court itself recognized, “unmistakable.” After all, the Torture Act
applies to “[w]hoever outside the United States . . . commits torture.”253
But while playing lip service to the idea that the presumption applied to
§ 924(c), the court in fact bypassed Morrison’s teaching in favor of an
unjustifiably broad reading of Bowman.
Recently, the Second Circuit became the second court of appeals to
consider § 924(c)’s extraterritorial reach.254 “Consider,” however, may
be too generous a characterization of the court’s treatment of the issue.
Defendant-Appellant Aafia Siddiqui was convicted of attempted murder
of U.S. nationals for firing an American serviceman’s M-4 at military
personnel while detained at a local police facility in Afghanistan.255 In
reviewing her appeal, the court gave short shrift to the argument that §
924(c) does not apply abroad:
As for § 924, which criminalizes the use of a firearm during
commission of a crime of violence, every federal court that has
considered the issue has given the statute extraterritorial application
where, as here, the underlying substantive criminal statutes apply
extraterritorially.
We see no reason to quarrel with their
conclusions.256

Significantly, the court’s reasoning was premised on its misguided
251. United States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d 775, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation
omitted).
252. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 814.
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (emphasis added).
254. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 2012).
255. Id. at 696–97.
256. Id. at 701.
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belief that “[t]he ordinary presumption that laws do not apply
extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes.”257
Every district court that has considered the issue has similarly found
that § 924(c) applies extraterritorially. But they have not generally
followed the Second Circuit’s implausible contention that the
presumption simply does not apply to criminal statutes as a class.
Instead, they have relied on an alternative theory, namely that § 924(c)
is an “ancillary” statute whose reach is determined by the scope of its
underlying predicates. In this regard, Judge Rakoff’s opinion in United
States v. Mardirossian, a case that we litigated, is instructive.
Judge Rakoff’s determination that § 924(c) is an ancillary statute
whose reach is coterminous with the underlying drug trafficking
offenses or crimes of violence enumerated therein is erroneous for at
least three reasons. First, there is no controlling precedent supporting
the use of an “ancillary statute” theory as a separate basis for defeating
the ordinary presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes.
In this way, the district court placed undue emphasis on United States v.
Yousef,258 a Second Circuit case that upheld the application of a
conspiracy statute to defendants accused of plotting to blow up
commercial aircraft. In Yousef, the court noted that “if Congress
intended United States courts to have jurisdiction over the substantive
crime of placing bombs on board the aircraft at issue, it is reasonable to
conclude that Congress also intended to vest in United States courts the
requisite jurisdiction over an extraterritorial conspiracy to commit that
crime.”259
The Morrison court made clear, however, that the
extraterritorial inquiry is a “merits” issue rather than a jurisdictional
one.260 Hence, while commission of an enumerated drug trafficking
offense or crime of violence empowers a court to hear a “case,” it says
nothing of whether Congress intended § 924(c) to reach extraterritorial
weapons possession. Moreover, both the conspiracy statute, which
speaks of “persons [who] conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States,”261 and the
substantive offenses charged in Yousef are, unlike § 924(c), subject to
the Bowman exception.
Second, the court’s analogy to conspiracy law is inapt. Section
924(c) is not functionally equivalent to solicitation, conspiracy, attempt,

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 700.
327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 87–88.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
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or any other inchoate offense that derives its substantive scope from an
underlying offense. As the Supreme Court has noted, § 924(c) is not
merely a penalty or a manner of committing a crime, but rather a crime
in its own right that punishes certain conduct, namely carrying or using
a weapon during a violent crime or drug trafficking offense.262
Third, the court’s analysis illustrates a broader point about how lower
courts view civil and criminal statutes differently when determining a
statute’s extraterritorial application.
In Mardirossian, the court
accepted the government’s argument that, because the predicate crimes
of violence and drug trafficking had explicit extraterritorial application,
§ 924(c) must likewise apply to extraterritorial conduct. But just a year
earlier, Judge Rakoff had rejected a similar argument when offered by
civil plaintiffs. In that case, the court explained:
Plaintiffs’ superficial argument—that since the federal statutes
prohibiting money laundering are (they say) extraterritorial in nature, a
RICO action predicated on violations of those statutes should be given
extraterritorial application—entirely misapprehends both the teachings
of Morrison and the nature of RICO. . . . [T]he focus of RICO is on
the enterprise as the recipient of, or cover for, a pattern of criminal
activity. If, as noted above, RICO evidences no concern with foreign
enterprises, RICO does not apply where, as here, the alleged enterprise
and the impact of the predicate activity upon it are entirely foreign.263

Judge Rakoff’s analysis of RICO is undoubtedly correct. But his
reasoning is likewise applicable to § 924(c), a statute whose “focus” is
to penalize the possession and use of guns, presumably because in
Congress’s estimation such possession and use makes the commission
of the underlying criminal offenses more dangerous. It makes sense for
Congress to be primarily concerned with protecting inhabitants of the
territorial United States from domestic gun violence. Indeed, to the
extent that it is relevant, the legislative history suggests this was
precisely Congress’s focus when it enacted the law.264 Nevertheless,
courts appear reluctant to confine prosecutors’ power to bring such
charges in international cases.

262. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 10 (1978) (holding that § 924(c) “creates an
offense distinct from the underlying federal felony”); see also Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S.
120, 125 (2000) (“Congress already has determined that at least some portion of § 924, including
§ 924(c) itself, creates, not penalty enhancements, but entirely new crimes. See S. REP. NO. 98225, at 312–314 (1984) (“Section 924(c) sets out an offense distinct from the underlying felony
and is not simply a penalty provision.”)).
263. Cedeno v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2012).
264. See supra notes 224–33 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Article cannot hope to capture the myriad ways Morrison might
be invoked by criminal defendants going forward. Instead, we have
sought to illustrate by way of example how lower courts should
approach statutory interpretation in this area generally. Remaining
faithful to Morrison’s holding requires courts to ask whether a statute
evidences Congress’s considered judgment that extraterritorial
application of the statute is warranted. As we have argued, courts ought
not focus on whether such applications are wise policy because those
are determinations appropriately entrusted to the political braches. But
in a time when U.S. law enforcement agencies are increasingly asserting
their power overseas,265 it is incumbent upon courts to insist that
Congress speak with clarity and that the Executive operate within the
boundaries of clearly established law.

265. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, A New York Prosecutor with Worldwide Reach, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2011, at A1 (discussing international sting operations).

